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ARTICLES

STEALTH STATUTE-CORRUPTION,
THE SPENDING POWER, AND
THE RISE OF 18 U.S.C. § 666
George D. Brown*
This case involves the diversion of over $2,300,000.00, and the
time and efforts of police personnel, from the primary functions of
the police department, i.e., the protection of the public, the enforcement of the laws, and the apprehension of law-breakers....
Not only did the defendant misapply, convert and embezzle
funds, and engage in a course of fraud and deception, evidence at
trial also established that he diverted police personnel from their
responsibilities to the public in order to provide inordinate security
to the mayor and his relatives, and to assist the Chief himself in his
own personal business and affairs. The effect of these diversions of
money and personnel from their proper purposes and activities
must necessarily have had an adverse effect on the police department's ability to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute criminals
and to apprehend malefactors.
The City of Detroit is a tortured city. It is at times almost under
a state of siege by criminals, who have in many instances utterly no
regard for human life, and who prey upon the good citizens of the
community and devastate and destroy their neighborhoods.
In the face of that situation this defendant, the top law enforcement officer of the City of Detroit, elected to use the Secret Service
Fund, a fund dedicated by the people's representatives to be used to
fight organized crime, to combat the narcotics traffickers whose operations are a cancer on the residential neighborhoods of Detroit,
and to conduct undercover operations so vitally necessary to effec* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School; Chair, Massachusetts State
Ethics Commission. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not
reflect any position of the Commission. Research support for this article was made
possible by a grant from the Boston College Law School Dean's Fund.
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tive law enforcement, for his own corrupt purposes. Such conduct
was more than reprehensible. It was absolutely shameful ....1

The Chief s acts may well have been shameful, but do they rise to
the level of a federal case? He was convicted in federal court of violating 18 U.S.C. § 666,2 sometimes referred to as the "federal program
bribery provision. '3 This may seem surprising, since the case involved
neither bribery nor federal funds. In fact, it is a typical example of
one of the most extraordinary recent developments in federal andcorruption law: the rise of § 666 and its movement toward the status of
a general federal prohibition of corruption at the state and local
levels. 4 Section 666 warrants the term "stealth statute." Its explosive
development has generated little academic commentary. 5 The lower
federal courts have seen few problems with it. Yet the statute's current
status is in serious conflict with the Supreme Court's concerns for
6
dual sovereignty and state autonomy.
At the heart of the matter is a broad law passed to deal with a
narrow problem. 7 Section 666 applies when governmental or other
entities receive more than ten thousand dollars in federal benefits
within one year. It prohibits three basic forms of criminal activity: embezzling, stealing, and similar misappropriations of five thousand dollars or more worth of property of the recipient entity; corrupt
solicitation or acceptance by entity agents of anything of value in connection with matters involving five thousand dollars or more; and, corrupt offers to such agents in connection with such matters.
Conspicuously absent from these crimes is any requirement that the
1 United States v. Hart, 803 F. Supp. 53, 66-67 (E.D. Mich. 1992), affd, 70 F.3d
854 (6th Cir. 1995).
2 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
3 NORMAN ABRAMs & SARA SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITs ENFORcEMENT 233 (2d ed. 1993); see also id. at 226 & 243 n.a.
4 See id. at 243-53 (discussing f-ailure to enact a general federal statute); see also
Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to Watch
Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEcis. 153, 206-08 (1994) (criticizing proposed federal
legislation).
5 The principal discussion of the statute is Daniel N. Rosenstein, Note, Section
666: The Beast in the Federal CriminalArsenal 39 CATH.U. L. REv. 673 (1990); see also
David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 90-91(1994); Michael W. Carey et
al., FederalProsecutionof State and Local Officials: The Obstacles to PunishingBreaches of the
Public Trust and a Proposalfor Reform, Part One, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 301, 329-31 (1992);
Jay M. Green, Note, CriminalLaw-Does 18 U.S.C. § 666 Apply to the CorruptSolicitation
of PoliticalServices in Exchangefor MunicipalJobs?, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1033 (1992).
6 See e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 2365 (1997); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
7 See infra text accompanying notes 217-78.
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property or transaction in question involve federal funds. Yet the purpose of the statute was to protect these funds, specifically to give them
greater protection than they enjoyed under prior law.8
Congress enacted § 666 in 1984. Perhaps because of narrow legislative intent the statute did not play a major role for the first several
years of its existence. A 1990 commentary found limited case law, 9
while at the same time noting the statute's "potentially limitless
scope."' 0 Subsequent developments have borne out the wisdom of
the latter observation, while relegating the former to a historical footnote. From enactment to 1990 the statute generated nine reported
cases according to that study." From 1991-1996 the total jumped to
over sixty.12 Furthermore, reported cases are only the tip of the
13
iceberg.
What accounts for this extraordinary development? In the past,
federal prosecutors may have been uncertain about the new law's
scope, or hesitant to put it to broad uses. The unanswered question
was whether the courts would apply the statute narrowly-either in
14
accordance with the most natural reading of the legislative history,
or out of respect for principles of federalism' 5-or in the sweeping
fashion that the language invites. In United States v. Westmoreland,16 a
key early decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit gave a
clear green light. For that court, the way to protect federal funds in
the hands of a local government was to take a broad approach that
covered any transaction that the statute could reach, regardless of
8 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 369 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.AN. 3182, 3510;
see also Rosenstein, supra note 5, at 673.
9 See Rosenstein, supra note 5, at 690.
10 Id. at 674.
11 See id. at 696 nn.225-226. There appear to be seven cases decided between
1989-90 that are not listed in this note.
12 This calculation is based on cases published in the Federal Reporter and Federal Supplement. A case is counted each time § 666 was the basis of all or part of the
indictment.
13 See Carey et al., supranote 5, at 330 (stating that 49 persons had been convicted
and sentenced under this statute in the previous five years in the Southern District of
Mississippi alone).
14 In general, the legislative history supports a narrow construction. However,
portions of it do support a broader reading. See infta text accompanying notes
245-76.
15 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (relying on federalism grounds to
narrow the scope of the Age Discrimination and Employment Act as applied to appointed state judges); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (placing limits on
the prosecution of corruption under the mall fraud statute, partially on federalism
grounds).
16 841 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1988).
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whether that particular transaction involved federal funds. 17 This approach would spare the federal government the need to trace its
funds in a particular case. 18 More fundamentally, the court viewed
the statute's general approach as one of "preserv[ing] the integrity of
federal funds by assuring the integrity of the organizations or agencies
that receive them." 19 Westmoreland remains the touchstone case for
20
those who wish to apply § 666 broadly and literally.
Not all courts have been as eager to embrace § 666. As the volume of prosecutions has risen, so have the expressions of concern.
Recently, a district judge felt compelled to remind the government
that § 666 is not a general and-corruption statute. 21 Some courts have
nibbled around the edges of the statute, taking a narrow view of who
is an "agent" of the recipient entity,2 2 or what constitutes a federal

benefit that triggers the statute. 23 On a more fundamental level, while
federalism-based constitutional attacks have failed, 24 some courts have
shown a willingness to look for federal funds, or at least a possible
26
impact on federal funds, 25 before applying the statute.
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Salinas v. United
States,27 a case raising the latter issue. A decision could be the source
of considerable guidance, although it may not be necessary to con-

17 Id. at 576.
18

Id. at 577.

19 Id. at 578.
20

See, e.g., United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484, 495 (2d Cir. 1996) (Lumbard, J.,

dissenting).
21 See United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536, 1540 (S.D. Cal. 1996). See 'also
United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1203-04 (5th Cir. 1996) (jolly, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom., Salinas v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997).
22 See United States v. Ferber, 966 F. Supp. 90 (D. Mass. 1997).
23 See United States v. Wyncoop, 11 F.3d 119, 122 (9th Cir. 1993).
24 See United States v. Cantor, 897 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v.
Bigler, 907 F. Supp. 401 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
25 See Frega, 933 F. Supp. at 1542; cf Foley, 73 F.3d at 490 (indicating importance
of possible impact on federal funds).
26 See Foley, 73 F.3d at 490.
27 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997). The question relevant to this article on which the
Court granted certiorariis as follows: "What kind of cases involving state employees are
subject to prosecution under the Federal Bribery Statute, 18 U.S.C. Section 666? Do
such cases include cases where no federal funds are disbursed or impinged?" Salinas
v. United States, 117 U.S. 1709 (1997), petitionfor certiorariat i. The court also granted
certiorarion an important question concerning the scope of RICO conspiracies. Id. at
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sider the outer limits
of § 666, given the substantial federal interest
28
present in the case.
However the Court resolves Salinas, major issues are certain to
remain. It is important to remember that § 666 represents an exercise
of the spending power.29 Even the current "conservative" Court, generally solicitous of state concerns, has recognized that this power permits Congress to exercise greater authority over states than it could
through the exercise of regulatory powers.30 Exercises of the power to
spend for the general welfare have great potential to alter the federalstate balance, as several significant articles have pointed out.31 Yet it is
easier to state the need for limits on the power than to formulate
them. Difficulties in curbing the scope of § 666 are closely linked to
problems in delineating the scope of the power upon which it rests.
Moreover, the entire landscape of federal-state relations is undergoing
a seismic transformation. Devolution, block grants, reduced federal
mandates, and other forms of "new federalism 32 raise serious ques33
tions about federal anti-corruption efforts.
These questions may be particularly difficult when federal funds
are involved. Should courts approach § 666 with a hands-off attitude,
on the theory that the monies have devolved to the recipient, or does
the possibility that federal funds may be even harder to trace call for
34
greater vigilance in efforts to "protect" them?

28 Salinas involves the receipt of bribes by county officials for conjugal visits to a
federal prisoner housed in the county jail under an intergovernmental agreement.
Because the federal government is paying for the housing of a federal prisoner, there
seems a clear federal interest in the conditions of confinement. See infra text accompanying notes 310-42.
,,.29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.

30 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158-59(1992); South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); see also National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
852 n.17 (1976) (leaving spending power issue open while limiting commerce

power).
31 See Lynn A. Baker, ConditionalFederal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1911 (1995); Lewis B. Kaden, Politics, Money and State Sovereignty: The JudicialRole, 79
COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1979); Thomas McCoy & Barry Friedman, ConditionalSpending:

Federalism's Trojan Horse, 1988 Sup. CT. REv. 85.
32 See, e.g., Wilfred McCIay, A More Perfect Union? Toward a New Federalism, COMMENrit, Sept. 1995, at 28, 29-30; Richard C. Reuben, The New Federalism,A.BA. J.,
Apr. 1995, at 76; see generally,Jerry L. Mashaw & Dylan S. Calsyn, Block Grants,Entitlements andFederalism:A ConceptualMap of Contested Terrain, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 297
(1996).
33 See generally George D. Brown, Should Federalism Shield Corruption?-MailFraud,
State Law and Post-Lopez Analysis, 82 CoRNELL L. REv. 225 (1997).

34 See United States v. Dransfield, 913 F. Supp. 702, 710-11 (E.D.N.Y. 1996)
(block grant mechanism justifies broad approach to § 666).
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This Article addresses the important questions raised by § 666. I
propose answers, but recognize that they are tentative at this stage of
development of the statute. There is no Supreme Court decision construing it, and a dearth of guidance in the literature.3 5 Still, § 666
cannot remain in academic obscurity. It is rapidly becoming one of
the federal prosecutors' principal weapons in the fight against state
and local corruption. The rise of § 666 forces a hard look at these
efforts, at the role of the spending power as a constitutional underpinning of them, and, ultimately, at the allocation of political power in
our federal system. The current Supreme Court's emphasis on the
concept of "dual sovereignty"3 6 indicates a willingness to return to
"first principles" 3 7 in considering this general issue.
Part I of the Article reviews briefly the federal role in prosecuting
state and local corruption. After examining the legitimacy of federal
interest in the subject, it focuses on exercises of national regulatory
powers, such as that over commerce, 3 8 and considers recent decisions
such as Printz v. United States3 9 and United States v. Lopez. 40 Especially
after Printz, national control over state and local officials is suspect.
Federal authority to prosecute those officials cannot be taken for
granted. Part II considers the special case of the spending power,
both as a source of federal authority generally and as the basis of increasing anti-corruption prosecutions. Part III examines § 666 itself
and traces the rise in decided cases. Part IV considers the possibility
of establishing limits to the statute. This Part focuses on the statute as
an exercise of the spending power and considers constitutional approaches, such as those formulated in the context of grant-in-aid programs, and statutory approaches, such as the clear statement rule. I
treat the Salinas case 41 at some length. My contention is that the case
gives the Court the opportunity to formulate limits, although they may
not apply to defeat prosecution in that instance. Part V examines two
other problems that may grow in importance as § 666 grows in use.
The first is whether § 666 covers gratuities offenses as well as bribery.
35 Rosenstein, supra note 5, is a thorough early treatment of the issues. For brief
discussions of the statute, see ABRAMs & BzE, supra note 3, at 233; Engdahl, supra
note 5, at 90-91.
36 Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2376 (1997) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 502 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)).
37 United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1626 (1995).
38 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
39 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
40 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
41 United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. grantedsub nom.,
Salinas v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997).
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I conclude that it does not, despite Second Circuit precedent to the
contrary.42 Secondly, I consider whether the statute's general prohibition of theft or embezzlement of, obtaining by fraud, or misapplication of property of five thousand dollars contains the potential to
become another federal "honest services" statute. 43 I find evidence of
this potential in several of the cases and argue against any such development. This particular argument for limits is an example of the Article's broader thesis: § 666, like the spending power upon which it is
based, has great potential to upset the federal-state balance through
broad application. In each case, the task is to impose limits, based in
federalism, upon a very broad text, while mindful of the important
role of federal prosecutions.
I.

THE FEDERAL ROLE IN PROSECUTING STATE AND LOCAL
CORRUPTION-THE CoNTRovERsY AND ITS STATUS

Prosecuting state and local corruption is an important activity of
United States Attorneys across the country. This major federal law
enforcement priority emerged in the early 1970s

abated. 45

4

and continues un-

governors46

Sub-national officials from
to sewer inspectors 47
have stood in the federal dock. Many observers of the national judicial system view these prosecutions as part of the distinctive mission of
the federal courts. 48 At the same time, these activities are a source of
controversy and tension. They pose difficult problems, with respect to
42

See United States v. Crozier, 987 F.2d 893, 899 (2d Cir. 1993); see also infratext

accompanying notes 472-508.
43, 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994). See generally Brown, supranote 33, at 244-48 (discussing the role of the honest services doctrine and the mail fraud statute in the prosecution of state and local corruption).
44 See Andrew T. Baxter, FederalDiscretion in the Prosecution of LocalPolitical Cornuption, 10 PEPP. L. REv. 321, 323 n.13 (1983).
45 As of December 31, 1994 there were 2,090 state and local officials awaiting trial
for abuse of public office. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JusTICE STATISTIcs-1995, 533 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1996). Addi-

tionally, between 1973 and 1994, 6,435 state and local officials were indicted on
federal charges. See id see also Moohr, supra note 4, at 154 (citing earlier figures on
federal prosecutions of state and local officials).

46 See United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1352 (4th Cir. 1979) (prosecution
of Governor Marvin Mandel of Maryland), affd en banc, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974) (prosecution of Governor Otto

Kerner of Illinois).
47
48
THE

See United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1987).
See, e.g., JuDIcIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG
FEDERAL COURTS 25 (d) (1995).

RANGE PLAN FOR
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statutory interpretation, 49 separation of powers,5 0 federal-state rela-

52
tions,5 1 and, ultimately, the existence and scope of national power.
5
3
54
Decisions such as Printz v. United States United States v. Lopez, and

New York v. United States,5 5 bring the latter issue to the fore, but
broader considerations of federalism predate these cases and their
specific issues. 56 Indeed, the whole question of the federal role in
fighting state and local corruption can benefit from re-examination.
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that there is no
57
general federal statute dealing with state and local corruption.
There have been numerous proposals for such a law, but Congress has
not enacted any of them. As a result, federal prosecutors utilize a
patchwork approach, relying on an array of statutes whose principal
target is not state and local corruption. 58 Most analysts59 identify four
49 An example of this is McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), which interpreted the mail fraud statute narrowly in an attempt to limit federal prosecutions of
state and local officials. Congress subsequently overturned the decision by adding the
"honest services" language, thus endorsing a broader interpretation. 18 U.S.C. § 1346
(1994); see also Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992), in which the Court divided
sharply over construction of the extortion component of the Hobbs Act.
50 In this context, an important problem is the broad nature of prosecutorial
discretion. See Gregory Howard Williams, Good Government by ProsecutorialDecree: The
Use andAbuse of Mail Fraud,32 ARiz. L. REv 137, 148 (1990); see also Baxter, supranote
44, at 336 (contending that delegation of the power to create new federal felonies to
prosecutors would be objectionable because of separation of powers concerns);
Moohr, supra note 4, at 178-83 (discussing the implications of prosecutorial discretion on the principle of separation of powers). The respective roles of Congress and
the courts in developing the federal criminal law are also an important consideration.
See Brown, supra note 33, at 296-99 (discussing federal common law approach to development of honest services doctrine).
51 See Baxter, supra note 44, at 337-38; Moohr, supra note 4, at 175-76; Williams,
supra note 51, at 153-57.
52 See Brown, supra note 33, at 227 (discussing the role of internal and external
limits on federal power).
53 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
54 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
55 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
56 Examples of earlier considerations of federalism issues include: Baxter, supra
note 44, at 336-43; Charles F. C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case
Study in the Making of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. LJ. 1171, 1213-14 (1977). Obviously, the decision in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), sparked
interest in the potential for federalism limits on the national government.
57 See ABRAMs & BEALE, supra note 3, at 248.
58 See Baxter, supra note 44, at 322 ("Faced with an inadequate statutory basis for
prosecuting corrupt local officials, federal enforcement officials began to apply four
federal statutes which traditionally had been applied to other forms of criminal activity."); see also ABRAMs & BEALE, supra note 3, at 243 (stating that pressure exists "for
expansive readings of the other federal statutes in question in order to allow federal
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principal laws that the national government relies on: the Hobbs
Act,60 the Travel Act,6 1 the mail fraud statute,62 and the Racketeer

Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).63
I believe it necessary to add two more statutes to the mix. Civil
rights crimes, prosecutable under 18 U.S.C. § 242, 64 can cover a wide
array of governmental abuses.6 5 In United States v. Lanier,6 6 the
Supreme Court showed a surprising receptivity to a broad reading of
this statute.6 7 The civil rights criminal jurisdiction has the potential to
reach beyond its traditional scope, particularly police abuses, 68 to a
69
range of state and local governmental activities.
As this Article contends, 18 U.S.C § 666, should also be added to
any list of the basic arsenal. Not only are prosecutors using it more
frequently, this statute has a key characteristic in common with those
listed above: the capacity for expansion far beyond its original boundaries to embrace a large number of corrupt practices. The absence of
a general statute on state and local corruption has led prosecutors to
prosecution of corruption in state and local government"); Williams, supra note 50, at
137 (describing the broad use of the mail fraud statute).
59 See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 44, at 332.

60 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).
61 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994).
62 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). Analysis of the mail fraud statute generally includes
the wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994), as well.
63 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994). For a general discussion of these statutes see Baxter,
supra note 44, at 330-33.
64 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994). The statute is directed primarily at deprivation under
color of law of "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States .... " Id.
65 See ABRAs & BEALE, supranote 3, at 580-614 (discussing the civil rights statute
and the cases applying it). The two other basic civil rights criminal statutes are 18
U.S.C. § 241 ("Conspiracy against rights") and 18 U.S.C. § 245 ("Federally protected
activities").
66 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997). Lanier involved prosecution of a state judge under
§ 242 for sexual harassment of litigants and court employees and applicants for jobs.
67 See id. at 1225 ("[t]he touchstone is whether the statute, either standing alone
or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the defendant's
conduct was criminal").
68 See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Koon, 833
F. Supp. 769 (C.D. Cal. 1993), af'd in part, vacated in part, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir.
1994), affd in part, rev'd in part,116 S. Ct. 2035 (1996); Indictment, United States v.
Robinson, No. 97-f0059-DPW (D. Mass. 1997) (on file with author); see also JuDIciAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 25
(e) (1995).
69 SeeABRAms & BEATE, supranote 3, at 598-603. In United States v. Senak, 477 F.2d
304, 308-09 (7th Cir. 1973), the Seventh Circuit, under § 242, upheld the indictment
of a public defender who exacted money from impoverished clients.
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"push the envelope" with individual laws in an effort to make the statute fit the crime. 70 The most widely cited example of this phenomenon is the mail fraud statute. 7 1 Professor, now Dean, Gregory
Williams contends that the federal government "us [es] the mail fraud
statute to develop an ad hoc Federal Code of Political Conduct." 72 Section 666 has the potential to generate similar developments.
Many critics of these efforts view them as presenting a serious separation of powers problem. 73 Under this view, Congress is no longer
making the law applicable to state and local corruption cases. Instead,
"the law" becomes what individual United States Attorneys decide to
prosecute, 7 4 along with decisions by federal judges and juries in particular cases. Recently, Professor Dan Kahan has challenged the validity of such attacks. 75 He makes his defense of "federal common law
crimes" 76 in the context of federal criminal law in general, but it applies with special force to anti-corruption cases, where the practice
may have reached its zenith. 77 Professor Kahan argues forcefully that
this kind of delegated lawmaking can further congressional intent and
lead to greater efficiency. 78 For him, the key question becomes
whether to vest interpretative discretion in individual United States
79
Attorneys or in the Justice Department.
70

See Ruff, supra note 56, at 1228. As Charles Ruff puts it, "Like Nature, the

federal prosecutor abhors a vacuum. Given a statutory grant of jurisdiction, he will
seek to bring within it any offense he finds unattended or even, in his view, inadequately attended." Id.
71

See, e.g., Moohr, supra note 4.

72 Williams, supra note 50, at 157.
73

See Baxter, supra note 44, at 336; Moohr, supra note 4, at 178-83; Williams,

supra note 50, at 148.
74

See Williams, supra note 50, at 144 ("They [prosecutors] are constantly defining

and redefining the meaning of fraud as they choose offenders").
75 Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal CriminalLaw , 110 Huv.L. REV.
469 (1996) [hereinafter, Kahan, Federal Criminal:Law]; Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. CT. REV. 345, 347 [hereinafter, Kahan, Lenity].
76 Kahan, Federal CriminalLaw, supra note 75, at 471.
77 See Brown, supranote 33, at 277-80 (discussing "federal common law" and the
rise of anti-corruption cases under the mail fraud statute).

78 Kahan, Lenity, supra note 75, at 425-26 ("Delegated lawmaking reduces the
cost of making criminal law... [and] also enhances the effectiveness of the criminal
law by preventing the under-inclusivity associated with excessive legislative specification of criminal prohibitions.").
79

Kahan, Federal Criminal Law, supra note 75, at 488-89 (discussing how to

"[i] mprove the content of federal criminal law by shifting to the Justice Department
the delegated lawmaking powers now exercised jointly by courts and individual
prosecutors.").
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It is important to recognize the separation of powers dimensions
of the debate over federal anti-corruption efforts. One's view of this
matter will affect how strongly one feels about limiting the scope of
particular laws, for example, through utilization of the rule of lenity8 0
Moreover, this is an area, among others, where separation of powers
and federalism work together to constrain the exercise of national
power over the states.8 ' Of the two, however, the federalism dimensions of the matter are far more serious.
As Charles Ruff puts it, federal anti-corruption prosecutions represent "perhaps the most sensitive area of potential federal-state conflict .... -"82 This is a widely shared view,8

3

which the Supreme Court

84

has also expressed, although not yet in a constitutional opinion striking down a federal initiative. The major theme of these criticisms is
that federal prosecution of state officials for the way in which they
govern strikes at the heart of state "autonomy,"85 especially the states'
ability to control their own political processes.8 6 What is particularly
interesting about the federalism critique is that it arose during a period when the status of federalism as ajudicially enforceable constitutional value was uncertain. The short reign of NationalLeague of Cities
v. Usey,8 7 with its concept of state sovereignty in specified zones, was
80 CompareDixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 511 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("Finally, I think it especially inappropriate to construe an ambiguous criminal statute unfavorably to the defendant when the construction that is adopted leaves
the statute as unclear in its coverage as the bare statutory language") with Kahan,
Lenity, supranote 75, at 397 ("Lenity is completely unnecessary to assure the fair and
predictable administration of criminal justice").
81 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349-50 (1971) (construing the statute
narrowly to preserve the role of states in the "federal-state" balance).
82 Ruff, supra note 56, at 1172.
83 See Moohr, supra note 4, at 155-56. ("Mail fraud prosecutions for political corruption ... conflict with a fundamental principal of federalism by diminishing state
and local autonomy and threatening other constitutional provisions."); see also
Charles N. Whitaker, Note, FederalProsecution of State and Local Bribery: Inappropriate
Tools and the Needfor a StructuredApproach, 78 VA. L. REv. 1617 (1992); Williams, supra
note 50, at 153-57.
84 See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356-60 (1987) (attempting to limit
mail fraud prosecutions based in part on federalist premises); see also Evans v. United
States, 504 U.S. 255, 290-94 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Dixson, 465 U.S. at
501-12 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85 See Baxter, supra note 44, at 337; Moohr, supra note 4, at 157-58.
86 See Williams, supra note 50, at 154. As Professor Williams states: "the growing
divergence of views between federal and state governments on criminal justice issues
may revive questions about the role of the federal government in establishing ethical
standards for the states." Id.
87 426 U.S. 833 (1976). National League of Cities was overturned by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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precarious at best. Recent decisions of the Supreme Court, such as
Printz,88 Lopez, 89 and New York, 90 suggest that federalism-based criti-

ques of national anti-corruption efforts need to be taken even more
seriously.
Before considering the force of these critiques, it is helpful to ask
why the federal government cares about state and local corruption
and from what source it derives its power to act on the matter. Should
a case like United States v. Hart9 l end up in federal court? Understanding the extent and force of national interests helps to place in perspective questions of national power as well as possible limits on it.92
The most frequent contention is that the federal government should
step in when state and local officials are unable or unwilling to act
because of possible corruption in their own ranks. 93 Such circumstances do arise, but the justification begs the question why the federal
government cares in the first place. 9 4 Perhaps the national government is concerned with the honest functioning of state government as
a form of civil rights of citizens that it is obliged to protect.95 The
quote from Hart about Detroit as a "tortured" city96 suggests a failure
of local governments to protect basic rights to life, safety, and prop88 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
89 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
90 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
91 803 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Mich. 1992), affd, 70 F.3d 854 (6th Cir. 1995).
92 But see ABRAMs & BEALE, supra note 3, at 48 (questioning the correlation between constitutional doctrine and scope of national interest). I recognize that the
distinction is somewhat formalistic, particularly when interest and power may merge.
See Baxter, supra note 44, at 342.
93 See, e.g., Baxter, supranote 44, at 322 (discussing the unwillingness of state and
local law enforcement agencies to pursue corruption); Carey et al., supra note 5, at
331 ("[S]tate and local entities, for a multitude of reasons, are ill-equipped to police
themselves."); Rory K. Little, Myths and Principlesof Federalism, 46 HASTINGs LJ. 1029,
1077-80 (1995) (proposing a requirement of particularized inquiry into the effectiveness of state and local action); Whitaker, supra note 83, at 1623 ("[F]ederal prosecutors must intervene ... when the local authorities, for political or other reasons, are
otherwise unwilling to prosecute.").
94 See, e.g., Brown, supra note 33, at 241; Ruff, supra note 56, at 1314. Professor
Williams questions the need for the federal government to step in based on the alternate ground of growing state professionalism. Williams, supra note 50, at 155.
95 See Williams, supra note 50, at 155 ("The second reason, often articulated as the
basis for federal intervention to control state and local corruption, is that the federal
government has a special constitutional obligation to ensure that states are free of
political corruption and managed on a fair and non-partisan basis"); see also Adam H.
Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for FederalProsecutions of State and Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 367 (1989).
96 803 F. Supp. at 67.
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erty. The Guarantee Clause 9 7 may justify federal intervention to rectify such failures. 98 Alternatively, one can take the view that
governmental corruption at any level threatens public confidence at
all levels. Thus, the federal government is protecting itself.99 Indeed,
the national government has an interest in healthy state governments
both to preserve balance in the federal system and to ensure that subnational governments continue to serve as a talent pool for its own
00
ranks.
In terms of general federal interests, there may wel be instances
of state and local corruption that affect segments of the national economy, such as the securities market. 1 1 Certainly a widespread economic failure of local governments would have national
repercussions. Massive embezzlements like those found in Hart may
contribute to local fiscal instability. It is possible that the case for federal intervention is strengthened by the fact that many of the federal
laws in question are not aimed at state and local corruption per se, but
at crimes that Congress wanted to punish whenever they occur, usually because of an effect on commerce. 10 2 These laws regulate private
97 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. "The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government .... " Id.
98 For an extensive historical and doctrinal development of the Guarantee Clause
rationale, see Kurland, supra note 95.
99 See e.g., Baxter, supranote 44, at 322 ("[c]orrupt schemes at the state and local
level... [were] at least as corrosive of the governmental process as corruption at the
federal level." (quoting Thomas H. Henderson, Jr., The ExpandingRole ofFederalProsecutors in Combating State and Local Political Corruption, 8 CUMB. L. REv. 385, 386
(1977))). Professor Williams accepts this premise, but would require that more specific statutes be enacted. Williams, supranote 50, at 155-56; see also Brown, supra note
33, at 241.
100 See Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism: Finding a Formula for the
Future,47 VAND. L. REV. 1563, 1574 (1994); see also GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTrONAL LAW 185-86 (3d ed. 1996) (citing ProfessorJesse Choper's argument that
federal officials' experience in state and local office ensures responsiveness to concerns of those levels of government).
101 See, e.g., United States v. ReBrook, 837 F. Supp. 162 (S.D. W. Va. 1993) (indicting the state lottery attorney for wire fraud and insider trading in violation of
securities laws), affd in part,58 F.3d 961 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 431 (1995);
see also Ruff, supranote 56, at 1215 (citing United States v. Hall, 536 F.2d 313, 316-18
(10th Cir. 1976)) (noting that federal intervention was reasonable, despite no direct
federal impact, in light of the substantial federal interest in questions of retirement
security and in the protection of the securities market).
102 See, e.g., The Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994). "Whoever in any way or
degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion... shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both." Id. at § 1951(a). It must be recognized that Congress may be less concerned with commerce than with using a "jurisdic-
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individuals as well as state officials. One cannot ignore, however, the
fact that individual federal prosecutors sometimes push these statutes
to their limits in order to vindicate perceived federal interests in com10 3
bating state and local corruption.
It is possible to identify more specific federal interests than those
discussed above. Police corruption, for example, can threaten joint
federal-state law enforcement efforts and may be directly related to
federal crimes such as drug offenses. 10 4 Perhaps the actions in Hart
do not present these particular dangers, but police corruption may
not be a divisible phenomenon. 0 5 Charles Ruff suggests the following as "readily identifiable federal interests:' 0 6 "the safety of federal
officers, protection of the mails or of federally insured banks, and defense of the national security, as well as enforcement of the increasing
number of federal regulatory schemes.' 0 7 One may also derive "[a]
substantial federal interest in the prosecution of local political corrupdon ...from [the] resulting interference with federal programs or
08
the improper use of federal funds.'
Let us assume that the potential range of federal interests, both
general and specific, could justify national intervention to deal with
state and local corruption much of the time, while recognizing that
there are cases of such corruption in which no national interest is
readily identifiable. 0 9 Federal interest, however, does not necessarily
equal federal power. Most federal anti-corruption law, like federal
criminal law generally, grew up at a time when the existence of federal
authority, particularly under the Commerce Clause, 110 was rarely
questioned. I" Important statutes, such as the Hobbs and Travel
tional hook" to get at the underlying offense. See ABRAMs & BEALE, supra note 3, at
34-38 (discussing statutory approaches and proposals for a federal criminal code).
103 See ABRAMs & BEATE, supra note 3, at 246-47; Williams, supra note 50, at 147
("U.S. Attorneys are a highly politicized group and their particular views on government affect charging decisions.").
104 See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 44, at 339.
105 See, e.g., Ruff, supra note 56, at 1218.
106 Id. at 1209.
107 Id.
108 Baxter, supra note 44, at 342.
109 See, e.g., id. at 342-43 (discussing the use of RICO to prosecute a traffic court
judge for collecting bribes from employees to guarantee their continued tenure and
to "fix" traffic tickets); Ruff, supra note 56, at 1217 (discussing the role of federal
prosecutions in state judiciary corruption).
110 U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
111 See, e.g., G.Robert Blakey, FederalCriminalLaw: The Need, Not for Revised Constitutional Theory or New CongressionalStatutes, but the Exercise of Responsible ProsecutiveDiscretion, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1176-77 (1995).
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Acts, 112 are based on this source of power. The Supreme Court's 1995
decision in United States v. Lopezl" 3 is a sharp reminder that "[tihe
4
Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.""1
Lopez is a reaffirmation of internal limits,"a5 within the Commerce
Clause, on exercises of authority over matters deemed to be economic. The Lopez majority refused to "pile inference upon inference" 1 6 to find that possession of guns in or near schools is an
economic activity with a significant effect on commerce. The Court,
however, left open the mode of analysis under statutes that contain a
'jurisdictional element ' 1 7 such as an effect on interstate commerce.
The Hobbs 1 8 and Travel Acts, 119 as well as RICO,' 20 all contain such
an element or predicate.' 2 1 The mail fraud statute generally requires
use of the mails,' 22 although courts have applied this predicate liberally.123 After Lopez, it is likely that the jurisdictional prerequisites of

criminal statutes, particularly those involving commerce, will be ap124
plied more strictly in individual cases.
The civil rights criminal jurisdiction stands on an entirely different footing. Its basis is the Fourteenth Amendment-a constitutional
112
113

18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994).
115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).

114

Id. at 1626.

115 See SToNE ET AL., supranote 100, at 190 ("The distinction between internal and
external limits, though not always stated in those terms, pervades discussions of Congress' powers.").
116 Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1634.
117 Id. at 1631.
118 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).
119 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994).
120 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994).
121 A RICO prosecution can be based on multiple predicates involving interstate
commerce, combining the commission of acts of "racketeering activity" under statutes
containing such a predicate with the presence of an "enterprise engaged in, or the
activities of which affect... commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 1961-62 (1994).
122 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994). In 1994, Congress broadened the statute to include
"any private or commercial interstate carrier." Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 250006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2087 (codified

at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994)).
123 See Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-15 (1989) (perpetuating the
view that the mailing need only have a tangential relation to the scheme). The Court
might, of course, tighten this requirement. See id. at 723-24 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
124 See United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Paredes, 950 F. Supp. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). But see United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d
553 (7th Cir.) (upholding Hobbs Act jurisdiction under a "depletion of assets" theory), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 383 (1995). For a discussion of the application of the
jurisdictional prerequisites of criminal statutes, see Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions2, 109 HARv. L. REv. 13, 40 (1995).
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provision not subject to the federalism constraints that played a major
role in Lopez.125 One can expect that anti-corruption cases will test the
outer boundaries of 18 U.S.C. § 242, particularly after United States v.
Lanier.12 6 Section 242 penalizes deprivation under color of state law
"of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the
Constitution or laws of the United States ....

'

127

In Lanier,a unani-

mous Supreme Court held that the rights in question are not limited
to those established in Supreme Court decisions involving facts essentially similar to those present in a particular prosecution.1 28 Coming
after Lopez, Lanierseems to be a clear signal that federalism concerns
will not hinder the civil rights criminal jurisdiction. 129 If civil suits

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983130 are any guide, an extraordinary range of
state and local governmental abuse and misconduct 1 3 ' could now be
the subject of federal civil rights criminal prosecutions.
As for 18 U.S.C. § 666, the spending power is the source of Congress' authority to enact it.132 The Supreme Court's 1987 decision in
South Dakota v. Dole 33 is generally viewed as imposing few constraints
on Congress' ability to regulate state governments via the imposition
of grant conditions. 3 4 The question inevitably arises whether, in light
of Lopez, the Court will take another look at imposing limits on the
spending power.' 35 A number of conflicting decisions in the lower
courts provide it with the impetus to do so.' 3 6 If one treats the crimi125 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (concluding that remedial
power under the Fourteenth Amendment overrides a state's Eleventh Amendment
immunity).

126

117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997).

127 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1994).
128 Lanier, 117 S. Ct. at 1226-28.
129 See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 3, at 581, 598-602 (discussing application of
§ 242 to extortion on the ground that it is deprivation of property); Brown, supranote
33, at 237.
130 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).

131

See Lewis v. Sacramento County, 98 F.3d 434 (9th Cir.) (section 1983 action

based on high speed chase), cert. granted 117 S. Ct. 2406 (1997).
132 See United States v. Cantor, 897 F. Supp. 110, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("The parties

agree that Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 666 pursuant to its spending power.").
133
134

483 U.S. 203 (1987).
See id. at 212-18 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that while the Court's

interpretation of the spending power restrictions is correct, the loose application of
those restrictions makes them ineffective). For a discussion of the spending power
after Dole, see Baker, supra note 31.
135 See id. at 1916 (advocating that the Court "reinterpreted the Spending Clause
136 In a recent en banc decision by the Fourth Circuit, a plurality of the court
adopted Judge Luttig's dissenting opinion in the panel below. He advocated using
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nal sanction of § 666 as analogous to a grant condition, it is possible
that a reexamination of the breadth of the spending power will raise
serious questions about the scope of that statute.
A final issue for purposes of this section is whether external constitutional limits may play a role in defining the reach of federal anticorruption efforts. The concept of external limits rests on the supposition that even if the Constitution grants Congress the power to deal
with a given subject, exercises of that power may not contravene limits
on government activity found elsewhere in the Constitution. 13 7 Ever
since NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery,13 8 the possibility that federalism
might constitute such a limit, and that the courts might enforce it, has
been the subject of intense debate. 3 9 The demise of NationalLeague
of Cities140 appeared to put the subject to rest, but New York v. United
States'4 ' rekindled the debate. 142 In New York, the Court, emphasizing

concepts of state sovereignty and accountability, 143 held that Congress could not "commandeer" the authority of state legislatures to
enact a portion of a nuclear waste disposal scheme that was, admittedly, within the general commerce power.
Printz v. United States 144 applies the anti-commandeering principle to state executive branch officials. It represents both an extension
of New York and a reaffirmation of the concept of dual sovereignty as
an external limit on exercises of congressional power. The narrow
issue of the use of state law enforcement officers to carry out background checks as part of a federal gun control program served as the
occasion for a major pronouncement on the nature of the federal system. According to Justice Scalia, "[t]he Framers' experience under
Tenth Amendment and coercion principles to invalidate a revocation of funding by
the Secretary of Education. Virginia Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir.)
(en banc), revk 86 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir. 1997). But see Magyar v. Tucson Unified Sch.

Dist., 958 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Ariz. 1997) (disagreeing with the Fourth Circuit in Riley).
137 See STONE ET AL., supra note 100, at 189-90.
138 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
139 See Martha A. Field, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority: The
Demise ofa MisguidedDoctrine,99 HARv.L. Ruv. 84 (1985); Candice Hoke, Constitutional
Impediments to NationalHealth Reform: Tenth Amendment and Spending ClauseHurdles, 21
HAsr[NGs CONST. L.Q. 489 (1994); Mark Tushnet, Why the Supreme Court OverruledNational League of Cities, 47 VAND. L. Ruv. 1623 (1994).
140 National League of Cities was overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan.
Transit Authority., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
141 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
142 See Hoke, supra note 139; see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (narrowing the scope of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as it is applied to
appointed state judges).
143 New York, 505 U.S. at 175-76.
144 117 S.Ct. 2365 (1997).
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the Articles of Confederation had persuaded them that using the
states as the instruments of Federal governance was both ineffectual
and provocative of federal-state conflict.' 145 For the majority, federal
commands "to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program ... are

fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty."'14 6 The concept of dual sovereignty emphasizes both
47
state autonomy and the accountability of state governments.
To the extent that there are external limits on national actions,
federal anti-corruption prosecutions of state officials may well trigger
them. If one government cannot commandeer the political or executive processes of another, the same considerations of accountability,
autonomy, and sovereignty may limit its ability to police those
processes.' 48 For example, lines of accountability may be blurred if a
state's citizens do not know who is guarding the guardians. In anticorruption prosecutions, federal executive branch officials in federal
court utilize federal statutes passed by Congress to hold state officials
criminally accountable for their conduct of governmental affairs. The
concept of federalism as an external limit might suggest direct constitutional constraints on Congress' ability to pass statutes applicable to
state and local officials' 49 or at least to produce narrow judicial con145 Id. at 2377.
146 Id. at 2384.
147 See id. at 2376-77. One of the problems with external limits analysis is finding
direct textual support for it in the Constitution. In Printz, Justice Scalia recognized
the absence of precise text and stated that the answer to the external limits challenge
in that case was to "be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court." Id. at 2370. The
concept of state sovereignty also suggests respect for state institutional processes and
rejection of the notion of superiority of federal institutions. See Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2036-37 (1997) (noting availability and adequacy of a
state forum in rejecting availability of a federal court for challenge to state officials'
actions).
148 See Baxter, supra note 44, at 337-38; Moohr, supra note 4, at 156; Ruff, supra
note 56, at 1214; Williams, supra note 50, at 154, 156-57. It is important to note,
however, the ability of the federal government to protect the franchise and to intervene deeply into state and local political processes in order to ensure this protection.
See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, No "There" There: State Autonomy and Voting Rights Regulation,
65 U. COLO. L. REv. 835 (1994).
149 See Brown, supranote 33, at 264. There has been vigorous contention that the
Court's ruling in New York should apply only to state legislatures. See United States v.
Printz, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2404 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia, however,
insisted in Printz that "the distinction between congressional control of the States (impermissible) and congressional control of state officers (permissible) is based upon
the most egregious wrenching of statements out of context." Id. at 2394 n.16. The
Printz majority also declined to make any distinction between state and local officials.
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struction of the statutes through techniques such as the "clear statement rule." 150
I have recognized elsewhere that this argument is not a one-way
street. 15 ' Federal prosecutions help state governments, and their citizens, in several ways. They produce the short run benefit of eliminating specific instances of corruption. 52 On a more general level, these
prosecutions may raise citizen concerns about their own officials' failure to act. The latter result is likely if state law covers the matter,
particularly if federal officials are utilizing state law, incorporated into
the relevant federal statute, to prosecute state officials.' 5 3 In Massachusetts, an intense debate has focused on the role of federal prosecutors in applying state standards. 5 4 The result may be clearer state
laws and stronger state institutions. 15 5 Despite the value of these prosecutions, it is necessary to re-evaluate the federal laws authorizing
them in light of federalism-based limits on congressional power.
The question of external limits may be particularly relevant to an
exercise of the spending power such as § 666. The Court held in Dole
that federalism would not serve as an external constraint on such exercises.' 56 I argue below that treating federalism as an external constraint on the spending power merits serious consideration, both as a
general matter and in the context of § 666. As Dole demonstrates, attempts to formulate internal limits based on a distinction between
conditions and regulations may be doomed from the start. Any condition contains an element of regulation. The extraordinary growth of
§ 666's regulation of the internal affairs of state governments comes at
a time when advocates of devolution seek less federal control over
Compare id at 2382 n.15 (rejecting distinction) with id. at 2394-95 (StevensJ, dissenting) (suggesting distinction based on Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence).
150 See, e.g., United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Cal. 1996); see generally
Brown, supra note 33.

151

See Brown, supra note 33, at 282.

152

See Moohr, supra note 4, at 183-87.

153

See Brown, supra note 33, at 291.

154 See United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713 (1st Cir. 1996); Mark MacDougall &
Steven Ross, An Unethical Prosecution, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 12, 1996, at A27. ("The
duty of federal prosecutors is to enforce the law and do justice, not to push the edge
of the judicial envelope with novel or experimental criminal cases.").
155 See Brian C. Mooney, Bill Seeks to Clarify Conflict-of-Interest Law, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 5, 1997, at B6, availablein 1997 WL 6256306; see generally Carey et al., supranote 5
(acknowledging the ability to clarify state law, but noting that the federal prosecutions
are necessary to do so).
156 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987). ChiefJustice Rehnquist made
it quite clear that "independent constitutional bar" did not include a Tenth Amendment limitation. Id.
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state programmatic decisions. Perhaps the latter necessitates the former in order to avoid relinquishing all federal control over federal
monies. 157 In my view, however, there is a serious tension between the
growth of § 666 and current notions of federalism. The response to
this tension ought to be the limitation of the statute.
II. THE SPENDING POWER AND ITS LiMrs
Section 666 forbids a range of practices-including theft, embezzlement, fraud, and bribery' 5 8-by agents of entities receiving more
than $10,000 in federal benefits annually.1 59 One might assume that
the role of the statute is to protect the federal funds that trigger its
application. If this were the case, § 666 would simply be a law "necessary and proper for carrying into [e]xecution"'160 the power to spend
the money in the first place, that is, the power to provide for the general welfare, generally referred to as the spending power.' 61 However,
both in its text and its judicial application, the statute reaches far beyond conduct involving federal funds. The federal government seems
to be in the process of using a statute based on the spending power as
a general anti-corruption statute aimed at officials of subnational entities, primarily state and local governments. 16 2 To understand why
such an enterprise may be not only thinkable but also permissible, it is
necessary to understand the scope of the spending power as well as
the attempts to place limits on it.
The first clause of Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution states
that "It]he Congress shall have Power to lay and collect Taxes, Duties,
Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defense and general Welfare of the United States .... ,11 63 The ambiguities of this text have always presented serious problems. If read as
a blanket authorization to provide for the general welfare, the clause
would constitute a general police power, swallowing up the notion of
157 See United States v. Dransfield, 913 F. Supp. 702, 709-12 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
158 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1994). It is important to note, however, that federal jurisdiction is restricted to cases involving $5,000 or more.
159 The statute reads, in part: "(b) the circumstance referred to in subsection (a)
of this section is that the organization, government, or agency receives, in any one
year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant,
contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other form of Federal assistance." Id
160 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
161 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
162 The overwhelming majority of reported cases between 1985 and 1996 involved
officials of state and local governments or persons dealing with such units.
163 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
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enumerated powers.'6 On the other hand, if it only authorizes taxing
and spending in aid of the enumerated powers, the grant duplicates
the Necessary and Proper Clause.' 6 5 The Court has struggled to carve
out a middle ground, advocated early on by Alexander Hamilton,
under which "the clause confers a power separate and distinct from
those later enumerated, [and] is not restricted in meaning by the
166
grant of them."
No sooner had the Court accepted Hamilton's view of the reach
of the power than it set about trying to limit it. United States v. Butler
first suggested that the concept of the "general welfare" might itself
serve as a limit.' 6 7 This language, however, is not much of a limit.

Almost any governmental expenditure has the potential to make the
nation, or at least some portion of it, better off.' 68 Moreover, Con-

gress is in a better position than a court to make the essentially political judgment of what constitutes the general welfare. Indeed, a half
century after Butler, the Court stated that "[t] he level of deference to
the congressional decision is such that the Court has more recently
questioned whether 'general welfare' is ajudicially enforceable restric" 169
tion at all.
Butler did formulate a quite different limit on the power contained in the general welfare clause, as well as suggesting other possible limits. The Court held that the taxing and spending scheme at
issue in that case was "a statutory plan to regulate and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to the federal
government." 7 0 The opinion sought to distinguish between conditions placed on the receipt of federal funds and the purchasing of
-[64 See United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 64 (1936).
165 See id. at 65 ("[fn this view the phrase is mere tautology, for taxation and
appropriation are or may be necessary incidents of the exercise of any of the enumerated legislative powers.").
166 Id.
167 Id. at 65-66 ("Congress consequently has a substantive power to tax and to
appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exercised to provide for
the general welfare of the United States.").

168 "General welfare" must, by necessity, include subsets of the nation. Otherwise
it would refer only to expenditures that benefit the entire polity. But see id. at 67
(distinguishing between national and local welfare).

169 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U. S. 203, 208 n.2 (1987); see also Butler, 297 U.S. at
67 ("How great is the extent of that range, when the subject is the promotion of the

general welfare of the United States, we hardly need remark.").
170

Butler, 297 U.S. at 68. At issue in Butlerwas Section 9 of the Agricultural Ad-

justment Act, 1933, which allowed the Secretary of Agriculture to institute a special
tax on farm commodities and to use the proceeds to encourage decreases in production. This law was based on Congress' power to tax and spend. Id. at 53-56.
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impermissible
regulation. 7 1 The majority also warned against federal
17
2
"coercion," indicated a willingness to go beyond congressional "pretext,"' 7 3 and, in general, stressed the importance of maintaining the
federal-state balance in judicial examination of federal expenditures.174 Butler remains a major decision in analyses of the federalism
dimensions of national spending, particularly in the grant-in-aid con75
text, despite its precedential and doctrinal weaknesses.'
The most serious problem with reliance on Butler is its fundamental premise that Congress may not use the power of the purse to "indirectly accomplish ... ends [beyond granted powers] by taxing and
spending to purchase compliance."1 76 This is precisely what grants-inaid do, a fact the Court condoned when it refused to limit the taxing
and spending power to a necessary and proper scope.' 7 7 Yet Butlers
inconsistencies no doubt reflect the Court's unease about letting the
genie out of the bottle. Federal spending programs do extend deeply
into state domains, beyond Congress' regulatory power under a classical enumeration perspective.' 78 That is one reason why Congress enacts them. Recognizing this potential, the Butler Court rendered a
profoundly ambiguous opinion-giving the broad reading of the
spending power with one hand while striving to fashion constraints
17 9
with the other.
Despite its weaknesses, a number of excellent recent academic
analyses have echoed the latter dimension of Butler and sought to
build upon its distinction between conditions and regulation. 180 Professor Lynn Baker has argued persuasively that the Court must reinforce the willingness it showed in Lopez to treat federalism as judicially
enforceable and attempt to scrutinize exercises of the spending power
as it did with the commerce power in that case.' 8 ' She suggests adis171
172

See id. at 73.
Id. at 71.

173 Id. at 69.
174 E.g., i&Lat 63, 77-78.
175 See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 216-17 (noting Butler's questionable authority, particularly in light of the fact that today, the Agricultural Adjustment Act would likely be
within the commerce power).
176 Butler, 297 U.S. at 74.
177 See generally STONE ET AL., supra note 100, at 248-51.
178 See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995); Butler, 297 U.S. at 63.
179 See Baker, supra note 31, at 1927 (noting that the Butler court ruled that it was
the Tenth Amendment, not the "general Welfare" requirement, which restricted the
spending power).
180 See, e.g., McCoy & Friedman, supra note 31, at 107 (discussing the distinction
between conditions and regulations); see also Baker, supra note 31, at 1927.
181 Baker, supra note 31, at 1927.
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tinction between "reimbursement spending" and "regulatory spending"' 8 2 as a basis for spending clause analysis. 183 Professor Baker's
analysis reflects, in part, dissatisfaction with the Court's timid approach to spending power issues in South Dakota v. Dole.18 4 At least for
challenges to grant-in-aid statutes, Dole remains the touchstone. I argue in Part IV that it is highly relevant to analysis of § 666 as well.
At issue in Dole was a condition of federal highway aid directing
withholding of a percentage of funds in states with a minimum drinking age of less than twenty-one years. Building upon broad language
in Butler and successor cases,' 85 the Court had little difficulty upholding this condition. The majority emphasized Congress' ability to go
beyond specific enumerated powers and to use conditions "to further
broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of federal monies
upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and administrative directives."' 8 6 Culling spending power jurisprudence, the
Court did enunciate four limits on its exercise: Congress must act to
further the general welfare; it must state any conditions unambiguously; conditions must be related to the federal interest in question;
and, conditions must not violate other, independent constitutional restrictions on government activity.
187
The Court applied these "limits" in an almost cursory fashion.
Of particular relevance to this Article are the application of the last
two. The majority viewed the drinking age as "directly related to one
of the main purposes for which highway funds are expended-safe
interstate travel.' 188 In dissentJustice O'Connor criticized the attenuated nature of the relationship between the condition and the purpose of the funds. 18 9 In language that prefigures Chief Justice
Rehnquist's Commerce Clause analysis in Lopez, 190 she warned against
182

ME at 1963.

183 See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 31, at 122.
184 483 U.S. 203 (1987). Professor Baker seesJustice O'Connor's dissent in Dole as
"the most attractive alternative to date" on the issue of Congress' spending power.
Baker, supra note 31, at 1956.

185 See Butler,297 U.S. at 63; see also Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127,
143-44 (1947); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
186

Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)).

187 See generally Dole, 483 U.S. at 212 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); Baker, supra note
31; McCoy & Friedman, supra note 31.
188
189

Dole 483 U.S. at 208.
See id. at 213-14 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

190 115 S.Ct. 1624, 1634 (1995) ("To uphold the Government's contentions here,
we would have to pile inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to
convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police
power of the sort retained by the States.").
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letting Congress use such a condition to "effectively regulate almost
any area of a State's social, political, or economic life on the theory
that use of the interstate transportation system is somehow
enhanced."1 9 1
Justice O'Connor did not, however, disagree with the majority's
approach to the fourth limitation-the bearing of independent constitutional limitations. The Court held that any general federalism
92
limitations such as those emanating from the Tenth Amendment'
l9 3
are not applicable in the grant condition context.
The states can obviate federalism problems by not accepting the
funds that contain the objectionable condition. 94 According to Justice Rehnquist, the "independent constitutional bar" constraint refers
to limits on all governmental action, such as the prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment. 195 This limit on the limits takes a lot of
sting out of the fourth element. Moreover, it completely ignores the
substantial concerns for federal-state balance that pervade the Butler
opinion. Perhaps it is not surprising that the Dole Court took this position two years after Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority' 9 6 had rejected the notion of judicially enforceable federalism
limits on congressional power. However, the notion of federalismbased external limits enjoys considerably more force today than it did
in the mid-1980s.197 In Part IV of this Article I argue that adding federalism limits to the fourth factor would make a major difference in
application of the Dole test, and would strengthen the case for reining
in § 666.198

At the end of his opinion, Justice Rehnquist suggested an alternative basis for invalidating the condition: that it amounted to "coercion" of state choices. 199 The notion that federal spending can
20 0
amount to coercion of the recipient can be traced back to Butler.
191 Dole, 483 U.S. at 215 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
192 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
193 Dole, 483 U.S. at 210.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 210-11; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
196 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

197 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992); see generally Brown, supra note 33. It should be noted, however,
that even under New York, Congress enjoys considerable freedom under the spending
power, giving force to Professor Baker's argument that re-examining Congress' spending power is the next step. See Baker, supra note 31.
198 See text accompanying notes 343-70; see also Hoke, supra note 139, at 572.
199 Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
200 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936); see also Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937).
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However, federal courts have consistently rejected attempts to invalidate grant conditions on coercion grounds. 20 1 Attempts to demonstrate coercion do, in Justice Cardozo's words, "plunge the law in
endless difficulties." 20 2 Should a court look at the percentage of a
grant that might be withheld, the dollar amount in question, the relation of federal funds to state funds in the relevant area, or some other
variable? 20 3 Recently, a plurality of the Fourth Circuit returned to the
fray in a decision that overturned a grant condition. 20 4 The same
opinion also suggests the possibility of a federalism-based analysis like
that suggested above.20 5 There is enough ferment in the circuits that
20 6
the Supreme Court may step in and revisit Dole.
As far as existing Supreme Court precedent is concerned, the
case most relevant to federal use of the spending power to attack political corruption is Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission.2 0 7 A section of
the Hatch Act 20 8 forbade any "officer or employee of any State or local
agency whose principal employment is in connection with any activity
which is financed in whole or part by loans or grants made by the
United States or any Federal agency ... [from] tak[ing] any active

part in political management or in political campaigns. ' 20 9 The Court
conceded that Congress could not regulate these sorts of political activities directly.2 10 However, it saw the matter as a classic case of an
offer of federal funds that Oklahoma was free to reject.21

As part of

that offer, Congress could attach conditions seeking "betterpublic service
by requiring those who administer [federal] funds for national needs
21 2
to abstain from active political partisanship."
201 See Virginia Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 86 F.3d 1337, 1346 (4th Cir. 1996), rev'd en
bane, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting Virginia v. Browner, 80 F.3d 869, 881 (4th
Cir. 1996), for the observation that "[n]o court... has ever struck down a federal
statute on grounds that it exceeded the Spending Power").
202 Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 589-90 (1937).

203 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211-12; see also Hoke, supranote 139, at 571-72 (discussing
alternative to the coercion test); McCoy & Friedman, supra note 31, at 118-19 (discussing the difficulties of a coercion test).
204 Riey, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc), rev86 F.3d 1337 (1996).
205 See id. at 569-72.
206 See id.
at 580-82 (Hall, J., dissenting); see also Magyar v. Tucson Unified Sch.
Dist., 958 F. Supp. 1423 (D. Ariz. 1997) (disagreeing with the federalism argument in

Riley).
207
208
209
210
211
212

330 U.S. 127 (1947).
5 U.S.C. § 7324 (1993).
Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 129 n.1.
See id. at 143.
See id.
at 143-44.
Id. at 143 (emphasis added).
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Oklahoma is a very important case. 2 13 It is possible to view the
decision as simply authorizing Congress to prevent potentially harmful practices by those who administer federal funds, the disbursement
of which should not be tainted by partisanship. This is Justice
2 14
O'Connor's reading of Oklahoma in Dole.

This reading suggests emphasis on the latter part of the quoted
phrase, particularly on the words "those who administer federal
funds." On the other hand, the Dole majority cited Oklahoma, in part,
for the proposition that Congress can use spending conditions "to further broad national policy objectives." 215 Perhaps one should focus
on the earlier part of the phrase quoted from Oklahoma, namely the
reference to "better public service." It is important to remember that
Oklahoma was decided at the same time the Court was upholding the
basic Hatch Act at the federal level against a First Amendment attack. 21 6 The Court expressed great deference to Congress' view that
partisan practices by federal civil servants "menace the integrity and
competency of the service. ' 21 7 It is possible, then, to read Oklahoma
for the proposition that Congress can utilize a state or local government's receipt of federal funds as a hook to impose the "broad policy
objective" of honest public services upon that government. In the
next Part I consider whether § 666 has done precisely that.

III.

SECTION 666: TEXT, HISTORY, AND INTERPRETiVE DECISIONSTrE TENSION BETWEEN BROAD AND NARROW READINGS

A.

The Text

As with any statute, one should begin with the text of § 666. I
prepare to start, however, with a hypothetical version slightly different
from the actual version. Let us consider the first subsection of § 666,
213 See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 31, at 115 ("The decision in Oklahoma v.
United States Civil Service Commission is the only one of the cited cases that even argua-

bly lends any support to Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Dole.").
214

Dole, 483

U.S. at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("This condition is appropri-

ately viewed as a condition relating to how federal moneys were to be expended").
But see Baker, supra note 31, at 1961 (discussing Justice O'Connor's dissent in Dole).
One might view the condition as almost the equivalent of an administrative condition.
See Kaden, supra note 31, at 874.
215 Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)).
The Dole majority also later cited Oklahoma for the proposition that the state could

simply not accept the funding. Id. at 210.
See United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
217 Id. at 103. The court in Oklahoma noted that standards under the Hatch Act
are the same for federal and state employees, without reference to whether states
received federal funds. Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 144.
216
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with minor deletions, as if it were the entire statute. It would read as
follows:
§ 666. Theft or bribery
(a) Whoever,
(1) being an agent of an organization, or of a State, local, or
Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof (A) embezzles, steals, obtains by fraud, or otherwise without authority knowingly converts to the use of any person
other than the rightful owner or intentionally misapplies,
property that

-

(i) is valued at $5,000 or more, and
(ii) is owned by, or is under the care, custody, or control of such organization, government, or agency; or
(B) corruptly solicits or demands for the benefit of any
person, or accepts or agrees to accept, anything of value
from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded
in connection with any business, transaction, or series of
transactions of such organization, government, or agency
involving anything of value of $5,000 or more; or
(2) corruptly gives, offers or agrees to give anything of value to
any person, with intent to influence or reward an agent of an
organization or of a State, local or Indian tribal government, or
any agency thereof, in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more;
shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years,
or both.
The language would constitute a general anti-corruption statute,
subject to the five thousand dollar minimum amount. It would cover
such specific crimes by government officials and employees 218 as embezzlement, theft, and conversion. Misapplication may have a
broader meaning such as wrongful use of employee time and services. 219 Fraud, of course would reach even further. It could embrace
the entire concept of "honest services" by government employees.
The lower federal courts had developed such a concept in the context
of the mail fraud statute. 220 In 18 U.S.C. § 1346 the Congress codified
this development in response to a Supreme Court decision rejecting
218 Section 666 also includes provisions for nongovernmental persons, but these
are not relevant for the purpose of this article.
219 See United States v. Skelton, 816 F. Supp. 1132 (W.D. Tex. 1993) (nepotism
hiring as misapplication).
220 See, e.g., Moohr, supra note 4, at 163-66. This concept was developed as part of
the fraud prong of the statute rather than the property prong. See idt
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Deprivation of honest service covers a very broad range of official misconduct.2 22 It might not be a big step to transfer the concept
of honest services fraud to § 666.223
it.221

Section 666 would also cover bribery, probably extortion, 224 and,
possibly, gratuities offenses. 225 The result would be a federal prosecutor's dream: expansive coverage without the need to satisfy such annoying jurisdictional predicates as use of the mails, effect on
226
commerce, or interstate travel.
It may be objected that the concept of "property" serves as an
important limit to any extensive use of subsection (1) (A), particularly
an attempt to broaden the concept of fraud. "Property," however, is
an uncertain concept at best. 227 In McNally v. United States228 the

Court had held that honest services were not property, at least as a
matter of statutory construction. In the contemporaneous case of Carpenter v. United States, 2 29 however, the Court held that the mail and
wire fraud statutes do cover intangible property rights. 2 30 The combi-

nation of Carpenter and § 1346, overruling McNally, indicates that
"fraud" covers services and that "property" does not function as much
of a limit on its reach. Thus a court might hold, under my § 666 variant, that an official could defraud a governmental entity of his own
221 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1997). The statute is generally viewed as a response to the
Supreme Court's decision in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). See, e.g.,
Williams, supra note 50, at 138; United States v. Czubinski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1076 (1st
Cir. 1997).
222 See generally Brown, supra note 33.
223 Currently, the concept of deprivation of honest services only applies to the
mail and wire fraud statutes.
224 See Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 290-91 (1992) (Thomas,J, dissenting)
(discussing the expansionist tendencies in the use of the Hobbs Act to prosecute
extortion).
225 See United States v. Crozier, 987 F.2d 893, 899 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[W]e believe
that the statute, [§ 666], like § 201 (which it was enacted to supplement), should be
construed to include gratuities as well."); see also infra text accompanying notes
471-507.
226 See Carey et ai., supra note 5, at 330. ("[I]t [§ 666] does not require prosecu-

tors to stretch for jurisdiction.").
227 See ABRAMs & BEALE, supra note 3, at 158-59 (discussing a wide variety of
claims that property was involved in scheme to defraud); Moohr, supra note 4, at
168-69 (discussing McNally and the Court's construction of the mail fraud statute to
criminalize only those frauds that involve money or property).
228 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
229 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
230 Id. at 25-27.
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honest services. 2 3' It is true that the five thousand dollar valuation
requirement would function as something of a limit, although a large
range of transactions and jurisdictions would be included. Moreover,
where the "limit" is in question, a court can always reason that all
money potentially involved in any such matter is the rightful property
of the principal, that is, the governmental unit.232 Some peccadilloes
where less than five thousand dollars could be found would slip
through the net, but an extraordinary range of wrongdoing would still
be subject to § 666.
The above analysis shows what § 666 might have been, but the
close reader will object that the omissions render it academic in the
pejorative sense of the term. I omitted the following from the beginning of subsection (a): "Whoever, if the circumstance described in
subsection (b) of this statute exists-." Subsection (b) provides as
follows:
(b) The circumstance referred to in subsection (a) of this section is
that the organization, government, or agency receives, in any one
year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program
involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or
23 3
other form of Federal assistance.
Thus the actual statute may well prohibit everything I have described in my hypothetical analysis, but it contains a jurisdictional
predicate in addition to the five thousand dollar floor. Congress did
not enact anything resembling a "catch-all" statute. 23 4 It only applies
to jurisdictions receiving significant federal funds and only to significant transactions within those entities. 23 5 I have already dealt with the
latter "limit." More to the point, the former is not much of one
either.

231 But cf. United States v. Harloff, 815 F. Supp. 618 (W.D.N.Y. 1993) (declining to
hold that an official could defraud a government entity of his own honest services
through falsifying payroll records in a § 666 prosecution).
232 See MdNally, 483 U.S. at 377 n.10. (Stevens,J., dissenting) (citing agency principles for the proposition that the agent would have to turn over the money).
233 Subsection (c) excepts certain bona fide salary and other payments. Subsection (d) is definitional. I also omitted part of title which reads in full: "Theft or bribery concerning programs receiving Federal funds."
234 See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 144 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Rosenstein, supra note 5, at 690.
235 See Rosenstein, supra note 5, at 686.
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All states 23 6 and thousands of cities, towns, counties and special
districts receive federal funds. 23 7 Many of these will meet the ten
thousand dollar limit. Looking only at the reported cases under
§ 666, one finds states, 23 8 counties, 23 9 special districts, 240 an interstate
commission, 24 1 large cities such as Detroit 242 and Buffalo, 243 Tennes-

44
see cities of 9,651 and 7,128 persons, and a NewJersey city of 8,268.2
If receipt of ten thousand dollars within a calendar year is all it takes
to trigger § 666, the statute cuts a wide swath indeed. The hypothetical at the beginning of this Part does not look so hypothetical after all,
triggered as it might be in cases that have nothing to do with federal
funds. Did Congress intend to reach this far in a statute captioned
"Theft or bribery concerning programs receiving Federal funds"?

B.

The Legislative History

It may be that the language of § 666 is so clear that no recourse to
legislative history is necessary, at least in the context of ajudicial decision. The issue of when judges can go beyond statutory text and utilize legislative history is a contested one that I do not intend to treat
236 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL EXPENDrTURES
By STATE FOR FISCAL YEAR 1995, at 1. (Listing distribution of federal funds by state
and Territory).
237 A precise count may not be possible. However, grants to state and local governments have risen from $872 million in 1940 to $225 billion in 1995 and are estimated to rise to $282 billion in 2002. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, U.S.
GOV'T, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HISToRCAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE U.S.

COv'T, FISCAL YEAR 1997, at 193-94. The Bureau of the Census counts 85 thousand
units of government within the United States. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, 1992 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENT Table 1. There are 946 grant programs for
which state and local governments are eligible. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET, ExEcUIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, UPDATE TO THE 1996 30TH EDITION
CATALOG OF FEDERAL DOMESTIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, AEl 1-27.
238 See United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
239 See United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1988).
240 See United States v. Simas, 937 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1991).
241 See United States v. Peery, 977 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1992).
242 See United States v. Hart, 803 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Mich. 1992).
243 See United States v. Delano, 55 F.3d 720 (2d Cir. 1995).
244 See United States v. Brown, 66 F.3d 124 (6th Cir. 1995) (Humboldt, Tennessee); United States v. Valentine, 63 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 1995) (Sevierville, Tennessee);
United States v. Cicco, 938 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1991) (Guttenberg, NewJersey). These
figures are from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS. A Department press release of October 2, 1995 indicates that the population of
Sevierville has grown to 10,204. Press Release CB 95-179.
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here. 245 In terms of a nonjudicial inquiry, however, what congressional committees said can, at a minimum, put the language in context. What is striking about § 666 is that the text is unambiguously
broad, while the legislative history is almost as unambiguously
narrow.

246

According to the Senate Report generally viewed as the main
guide to § 666,247 the purpose of the statute was to "augment the ability of the United States to vindicate significant acts of theft, fraud, and
bribery involving Federal monies which are disbursed to private organizations or State and local governments pursuant to a Federal program."24 8 Congress was responding to the problem that no general
statute existed to deal with such cases and that other statutes reached

only part of the problem. The general theft of federal property statute249 applied only to property still legally that of the United States.
The fact that tide might have passed, or the funds have been commingled, created a "gap" in situations where there might still be a federal
interest. 250 Similarly, the federal bribery statute covered federal officials and "public officials" "acting for or on behalf of the United
States." 251 Lower courts had divided over whether that language cov25
ered local administrators of federal funds.

2

The Report indicates a desire to cover such officials and overturn
cases reaching an opposite result. 253 The Report makes clear that its
245 See United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985). In § 666 cases, the rule
may be more honored in the breach than in the observance. See; e.g., United States v.
Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d
572, 576 (5th Cir. 1988).
246 The cited legislative history of § 666 consists essentially of the Senate Report.
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 369 (1984), repinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. 3182, 3510. This
history is sparse at best. See Valentine, 63 F.3d at 463 (noting the "brevity" of discussion); United States v. Sanderson 966 F.2d 184, 188 (6th Cir. 1992) (describing the
legislative history of § 666 as "scant").
247 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 369 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.AN. 3182, 3510;
see also, e.g., Valentine, 63 F.3d at 463; Sanderson, 966 F.2d at 188. Daniel Rosenstein
also cites to S. REP. No. 97-307, at 726 (1981), in his discussion of § 666. See Rosenstein, supra note 5, at 686.
248 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 369 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.Ca-N. 3182, 3510.
The analysis in this article focuses on assistance to governmental units.
249 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1996).
250 S. REP. No. 98-225, at 369 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.CAN. 3182, 3510.
251 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994); see S. REP. No. 98-225, supranote 246, at 369, reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3510.
252 CompareUnited States v. Mosley, 659 F.2d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 1981) with United
States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656, 662 (2d Cir. 1975).
253 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 369-70 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3510-11.
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as
authors viewed bribery of fund administrators as equally serious
25 4
theft in terms of its effect on the "integrity of federal funds.
The Report seems focused on a narrow set of problems: theft,
similar diversions, and improper influences upon administration of
federal funds and other assistance to organizations and governments.
This reading places it in apparent conflict with the broad reach of the
actual statutory text. There are, however, within the Report several
concepts that, on closer examination, may serve to prefigure this
breadth. The first is that of the "Integrity of [federal] program
funds. '25 5 The term could have a range of meanings: keeping funds
intact; preventing them from being spent under dishonest conditions;
or, a more general concern for the entities that receive them. 256 One

might support the broad reading with the argument that entities that
are dishonest in their own management cannot be counted on to administer federal funds with "integrity."
The second potentially broad concept is that of an ongoing federal interest in the employees of recipient organizations that extends
beyond the point when federal assistance is received. 257 The cases
that troubled Congress involved refusals to extend the federal bribery
statute to matters such as the bribery of a Model Cities administrator.2 58 The lower courts' theory was that such individuals are not
"public officials" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 201.259 However,

the Supreme Court, in a decision roughly contemporaneous with pas-

254

Id.; see ABRAMs & BEAT , supra note 3, at 233 ("§ 666 is specifically aimed at

bribery of local officials in connection with federal programs....").
255 Id. (emphasis added).
256 See Rosenstein, supranote 5, at 686; see also United States v. Westmoreland, 841
F.2d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 1988).
257 See Rosenstein, supra note 5, at 689 ("Thus, the statute suggests that a relationship between the ... governmental entity and the Federal government, resulting from

a federal grant or benefit program, opens the door to federal jurisdiction over an
employee of that entity, regardless of any specific connection that employee might
have to either the federal program or the Federal Government"); see also Carey et al.,
supra note 5, at 331 (noting that state and local governments are in some measure
.creatures of the federal government").
258 See United States v. Del Toro, 513 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975), cited in S. REP. No.
98-225, at 370 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3511.
259 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994). For the purposes of the statute, the term "public offi-

cial" refers to "Member of Congress, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner... or an
officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any
department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including the District of Columbia, in any official function, under or by authority of any such department, agency
or branch of Government." Id.
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sage of § 666, rejected that view. 26 0 In Dixson v. United States,2 61 the

Court established a standard focusing on "whether the person occu2 62
pies a position of public trust with official federal responsibilities."
The Court did qualify its test somewhat by requiring that "IIt]o be a
public official under section 201 (a), an individual must possess some
degree of official responsibility for carrying out a federal program or
policy.

'263

Even this limitation was not enough forJustice O'Connor, joined
by three other dissenters. 264 In part, she invoked the rule of lenity in
applying a statute whose key term-"public official"-was ambiguous.

265

The more significant aspect of her dissent rests on arguments

that I believe will surface in the forthcoming debate over the scope of
§ 666. She invoked the principle of "grantee autonomy, '26 6 particularly when the grantee is a unit of state or local government, for the
following proposition: "A proper respect for the sovereignty of States
requires that federal programs not be interpreted to deputize States
or their political subdivisions to act on behalf of the United States
unless such deputy status is expressly accepted or, where lawful, expressly imposed." 267 This remarkable utilization of federalism principles anticipates both her expansion of clear statement rules in Gregory
v. Ashcrof2 68 and her ultimate elevation of nondeputizing principles to
constitutional status in New York v. United States.2 69 The Dixson Court,
however, went the other way. So, perhaps, did Congress.
The legislative history also contains language that courts might
treat as a direct call for a broad construction of the statute. The Report states the Committee's intent:
260 See Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482 (1984). The Senate Report dealing
with § 666 notes the pendency of the Court's decision in Dixson. S. REP. No. 98-225,
supra note 246, at 370, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.CA.N. at 3511 n.2.
261 465 U.S. 482 (1984).
262 Id at 496. "By accepting the responsibility for distributing these federal fiscal
resources, petitioners assumed the quintessentially official role of administering a social service program established by the United States Congress." IM
263 Id. at 499; see also ABRAMs & BEALE, supra note 3, at 233 (noting the overlap
between § 201 and § 666).
264 See Dixson, 465 U.S. at 501 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor was
joined in her dissent by Justices Brennan, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Id
265 See id- at 511. But see Dan M. Kahan, Lenity, supra note 75, at 345 (arguing
against the use of the rule of lenity in federal criminal law).
266 Dixson, 465 U.S. at 508-09, 511 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
267 Id. at 510 (emphasis added).
268 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
269 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see also Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
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that the term 'Federal program involving a grant, a contract, a sub-

sidy, a loan, a guarantee, insurance, or another form of Federal
assistance' be construed broadly, consistent with the purpose of this
section to protect the integrity of the vast sums of money distributed
through Federal programs from theft, fraud, and undue influence
270
by bribery.
This call for broad construction applies only to a part of the statute. However, it would be easy for a court to apply this exhortation to
27 1
the entire statute. To some extent, this has already happened.
Finally, it should be noted that the innocuous reference to the
272
derivation of the bill that became § 666 from a previous proposal
may contain more than meets the eye. The earlier bill, S. 1630, the
Criminal Code Reform Act of 1981 was tied much more directly to the
presence of federal funds than the current § 666.273 Its prohibition of
274
thefts was limited to property of the federally funded program.
275
The previous Committee Report contains similar limitations.
The
bribery section applied to an "agent or fiduciary of... an organization
charged . . .with administering monies or property derived from a
federal program, and the recipient's conduct is related to the administration of such program ."276 Section 666 takes the significant step of
applying its prohibitions to the recipient without any such limits. One
court of appeals has already relied heavily on this difference between
the two proposals to apply § 666 broadly against a defendant seeking
27 7
to limit it to federally-funded projects.
Despite these openings to daylight, I view the legislative history,
fairly read, as supporting the interpretation that Congress intended to
deal with a relatively narrow problem, specified forms of malfeasance
in connection with the administration of federal assistance. But it is
impossible to deny that the actual statute is the antithesis of narrow.
Fairly read, it gives the federal government authority to deal with a
270 S.REP. No. 98-225, at 370 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3511.
271 See United States v. Rooney, 37 F.3d 847 (2d Cir. 1994). While the court in
Rooney discussed a broad construction of the statute, there was a narrow result in the
case as a whole.
272 See S. REP. No. 98-225, supra note 246, at 369, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
3510 (stating "It] he proposal is derived from S. 1630, the Criminal Code Reform Act
of 1981 approved by the Committee in the 97th Congress").
273 See United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 110 (2d Cir. 1993) (discussing limitations which exist in S.1630 which do not exist in § 666).
274 See id.
275 See id. at 110 n.l.
276 Id. at 110 (punctuation altered in quote).
277 See id at 109-10. The government relies substantially on this change in its brief
in Salinas. Brief for the United States at 16, Salinas v. United States, No. 96-738.
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range of malfeasance anywhere within governmental (and other) entities that benefit from a variety of programs, whether or not the wrongdoing is connected to the federal assistance. 2 78 Moreover, § 666 is not
a statute where Congress, through legislative use of open-ended, relatively undefined, delegatory terms, left it up to the courts to take the
broadening step of applying the law to unforeseen situations.2 79 The
statute is notjust potentially broad; it is explicitly broad, despite a legislative history that points in the other direction.
The text is an invitation to use the statute extensively. After an
initial period of relatively infrequent use, federal prosecutors have responded to this invitation with alacrity. Judicial reaction has encouraged this development. A 1990 commentary found "only nine
published opinions dealing with section 666 between its enactment in
1984 and the date of writing." 28 0 Since that date, the growth of pub-

lished opinions has been extraordinary. In 1996, for example, there
were fourteen published opinions dealing with the section. 28 1 Many
courts, focusing on the text, have given § 666 the extensive reading it
invites. 28 2 There is, however, a growing counter-trend. Some judges
seem to think that Congress cannot possibly have meant what it
said, 28 3 and that the statute must have limits. 2 84 It is helpful to get a

brief sense of the judicial environment before considering the possibility of limiting § 666.
278 See Rosenstein, supra note 5, at 700 (calling for narrower drafting of § 666).
279 This is the sort of situation that Professor Kahan envisages. However, the use
of the term "fraud" in § 666 might qualify as such a term.
280 Rosenstein, supra note 5, at 690 n.152. The nine decisions are as follows:
United States v. Bordallo, 857 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1988); United States v. Duvall, 846
F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572 (5th Cir.
1988); United States v. Barquin, 799 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Webb,
691 F. Supp. 1164 (N.D. Ill. 1988); United States v. Little, 687 F. Supp. 1042 (N.D.
Miss. 1988); United States v. Smith, 659 F. Supp. 833 (S.D. Miss. 1987); United States
v. Jackowe, 651 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); and United States v. Sadlier, 649 F.
Supp. 1560 (D. Mass. 1986). See Rosenstein, supra note 5, at 696-97 nn.225-226. But
see Carey et al., supra note 5, at 330 (noting that "in the Southern District of Mississippi alone, forty-nine persons involved in the corruption of county and local business
activities have been convicted and sentenced under this statute in the past five years").
281 I have used the number of published opinions for purposes of comparison.
Obviously, they do not reflect the large volume of prosecutions under § 666.
282 See, e.g., Coyne, 4 F.3d at 110.
283 See United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536, 1540 n.7 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (noting
that at oral argument, the United States agreed that its construction of the statute
would enable it to prosecute, for example, "a secretary for a state parking agency
receiv[ing] federal funds").
284 See United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1201 (5th Cir. 1996) (Jolly, J.,
dissenting), cert. granted sub nom. Salinas v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997).
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The Interpretative Climate and the Possibility of Supreme Court
Clarification

The foundation case is United States v. Westmoreland.28 5 A county
supervisor was convicted under § 666, as well as other federal statutes, 28 6 based on kickbacks for the awarding of county contracts. The
county received more than $10,000 in federal funds under the General Revenue Sharing program then in existence. 28 7 The indictment
tracked the statute in alleging the entity's receipt of the requisite federal funds, her receipt of a "thing of value," and the fact that receipt
was in connection with transactions involving more than $5,000 "concerning the affairs of' the county. 288 The defendant argued that the
government had to show that the government transactions in question
289
were financed by federal funds.
The court rejected this contention, holding that the statute
means what it says. The opinion relied both on the statutory language-which it found "plain and unambiguous" 29 0-and on the legislative history.29 1 The analysis focuses on the difficulty of tracing
292
federal funds and on gaps in the pre-§ 666 statutory framework.
Beyond the holding, Westmoreland contains two particularly significant
statements about the reach of § 666. The first is that Congress "has
cast a broad net to encompass local officials who may administer federal funds, regardless of whether they actually do.

'298

The second is

that Congress sought "to preserve the integrity offederalfunds by assuring
the integrity of the organizations or agencies that receive them."

294

The latter

statement is a crucial justification for the scope of § 666. It supports
285
286

841 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1988).
See id at 574. Defendant was also convicted on mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341

(1994), extortion, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994), and aiding and abetting an offense
against the United States, 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
287 See Westmoreland, 841 F.2d at at 575. For a general discussion of the revenue
sharing program, see George D. Brown, Beyond the New Federalism-RevenueSharing in
Perspective, 15 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1 (1977).
288 See Westmoreland, 841 F.2d at 574-75 (quoting from original version of the stat-

ute). For a discussion of whether this language covers bribes, gratuities, or both, see
infra text accompanying notes 472-508.
289 See id at 575-76.
290 Id. at 576.
at 576-77.
291 See id.
292 See id.
293

Id. at 577.

294 Id. at 578 (emphasis added); see also id. at 576 ("By the terms of section 666,
when a local government agency receives an annual benefit of more than $10,000
under a federal assistance program, its agents are governed by the statute, and an
agent violates subsection (b) when he engages in the prohibited conduct in any trans-
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Congress' extending its reach beyond federal funds and propertyeven in commingled or difficult-to-trace form-to the internal practices of the recipient. Integrity of funds295 has become integrity of
governments. 296 It is true that one might find a possible limit in West297
morelands references to the status and role of particular officials.
Subsequent cases, however, have focused on the Fifth Circuit's validation of considering the recipient's "integrity" and on its refusal to require any direct link between federal funds and the alleged criminal
298
activity.
Many of these cases involve governments that receive federal
grants-in-aid. Broad construction of § 666 is not limited to the grant
context, however. Courts have shown a willingness to apply it in a
variety of contexts such as the actions of a private developer of a federally assisted project, 2 99 a federal contract for services,3 0 0 and a passthrough of federal funds.3 0 ' There is a growing counter-trend, however. Some courts see serious federalism issues lurking in the sweep of
§ 666. Recently, the District Court for the Southern District of California warned against the broad reading of § 666 on the ground that
"it would drastically change the balance of power between federal and
state governments by bringing conduct that had previously been entirely in the realm of the states within the federal purview."3 0 2 In a
case involving the bribery of state judges3 0 3 the court formulated a
test based on the need to show "that federal funds were corruptly administered, were in danger of being corruptly administered, or even
action or matter or series of transactions or matters involving $5,000 or more concerning the affairs of the local government agency").
295 S.REP. No. 98-225, at 369 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.G.A.N. 3182, 3510.

296 There is a parallel argument under the mail fraud statute, in that concern for
the integrity of the mails has broadened to concern for integrity of government. See

generally Brown, supra note 33, at 225-28.
297 See Westmoreland, 841 F.2d at 578 (stating that "the statute limits its reach to
entities that receive a substantial amount of federal funds and to agents who have the
authority to effect significant transactions").
298 See, e.g., United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1288 (11th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100, 108-09 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Simas, 937 F.2d
459, 463 (9th Cir. 1991).
299 See United States v. Rooney, 37 F.3d 847 (2d Cir. 1994) (§ 666 applicable, but
conviction reversed because conduct not within prohibitions).
300 See United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub
nom. Salinas v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 1079 (1997).
301 See United States v. Dransfield, 913 F. Supp. 702 (E.D.N.Y. 1996).
302 United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536, 1540 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
303 See id. at 1538-39; see also Ruff, supra note 56, at 1217 (discussing the justification for federal prosecutions of members of the state judiciary).
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could have been corruptly administered, '30 4 and on the question of
whether there was a direct or indirect threat to federal funds. 30 5
Other courts have shown a willingness to interpret § 666 narrowly by
emphasizing the indirectness of the defendant's relationship to federal funds,3 0 6 or the existence of another federal statute more directly
30 7
on point.
At the core of the divergence is the question of how to apply
§ 666 to protect federal funds or property when no federal funds or
property are present in the case. Building on Westmoreland and its
progeny, the predominant view rests on two key premises: that Congress is properly concerned with the integrity of recipient governments, as well as with the integrity of federal funds, because
wrongdoing in any part of an entity can spill over to its administration
of federal funds; and that problems of tracing federal funds-exacerbated in the case of programs such as block grants-justify treating all
funds alike, as long as the $10,000 threshold is reached. This postWestmoreland view is consistent with decisions that have rejected out of
hand federalism-based constitutional challenges to § 666.308 Other
judges are not so sure. They warn against § 666 becoming a general
anti-corruption statute, 30 9 and criticize what they see as its "virtually
unlimited expansion." 31 0
This Term the Supreme Court will have the opportunity to shed
light on § 666 and to resolve a conflict between circuits over a seemingly narrow point. The specific issue is whether the bribery subsec304 Frega,933 F. Supp. at 1543. The court in Fregaalso pointed out that the "specificity is significant in that it reinforces the view that § 666 was intended to protect the
integrity of federal funds, and not as a general anti-corruption statute." Id. at-1542.
305 See id. at 1543.
306 See United States v. Wyncoop, 11 F.3d 119, 123 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Yet there is no
more reason to conclude that Congress in enacting section 666 intended to bring
employees at every college and university in the country within the scope of potential
federal criminal jurisdiction than it is to assume that Congress wished to reach employees of every grocery store.").
307 See United States v. Cicco, 938 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1991) (suggesting 18 U.S.C.
§ 601 as a more appropriate statute in case of politically related employment
decisions).
308 See United States v. Russo, No. 96-1394, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6513 (2d Cir.
April 8, 1997); United States v. Bigler, 907 F. Supp. 401 (S.D. Fla. 1995); United States
v. Cantor, 897 F. Supp. 110 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). But see Engdahl, supranote 5, at 91-92
(discussing the statute and contending that it lacks constitutional basis). The issue of
whether or not § 666 is unconstitutionally vague is not discussed here. See, e.g.,
United States v. Urlacher, 979 F.2d 935, 939 (2d Cir. 1992) (rejecting challenge of
§ 666 based on vagueness).
309 See Frega, 933 F. Supp. at 1542.
310 United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1201 (JollyJ. dissenting).
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tion of § 666311 applies when the matter involved has a value of $5,000
to the official but not necessarily to the recipient government. However, the case-Salinasv. United States 12 -could lead the Court to a
3 13 Salinas ingeneral statement about the applicability of the statute.
volved payments to officials of a county sheriffs department in exchange for allowing a federal prisoner housed at a county jail to have
conjugal visits.3 14 Federal funds helped finance construction of the
jail. In addition, there was an agreement between the federal government and the county to house federal prisoners at cost. The Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit unanimously found that the initial construction grant plus the ongoing contract constituted "Federal assistance. '3 15 The holding seems correct on this point even if the only
federal funds involved were the prisoner housing contract. Courts
have attempted to draw a distinction between payments by the government as a commercial entity and payments to further a federal statutory scheme or policy objectives. 3 16 The distinction may seem tenuous
in that all payments by the government further governmental objectives. However, some sort of line makes sense. In the case of a
purchase of supplies, for example,3 1 7 the federal interest in the use of
thefunds ceases when the purchase is made. In the case of a purchase
of a service such as housing prisoners, the national government has an
ongoing interest in how the services are performed, at least when it
has spelled out a policy concerning them. Here a federal statute declared a policy of providing "suitable quarters for the safekeeping,
care, and subsistence of all persons held under authority of any enactment of Congress." 3 18 The Supreme Court did not grant certiorarion
the receipt of federal funds issue, although if it is treated as jurisdictional, the Court might consider it.31 9 ,
311

18 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1) (B) (1994). This subsection deals with soliciting or ac-

cepting bribes. Subsection (a) (2) deals with offering or giving bribes.

312 Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted sub nom. Salinas v. United
States, 117 S.Ct. 1079 (1997).
313 See Salinas v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 1079 (1997), petitionfor certiorari.For the
text of the question raised by the petition, see supra note 27.
314 See Marmolejo, 89 F.3d at 1188.
315 See idat 1189-91. The dissent apparently accepts this point also. In its paraphrasing of the majority, it disagrees with the second point, the $5,000 value requirement, without addressing the first, the $10,000 federal assistance requirement,
implying agreement with, or at least acceptance of, the ruling that the $10,000 requirement had been met. See id at 1201 (Jolly,J., dissenting).
316 See id. at 1190 (citing United States v. Rooney, 986 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1993)).
317 See, e.g., United States v. Duvall, 846 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1988).
318 18 U.S.C. § 4002 (1994).
319 See United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484, 487-90 (2d Cir. 1996).
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The grant of certioraripertinent to § 666 arises from the second
issue in the case: whether the officials received anything of value intending to be influenced "in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such government . . . involving
anything of value of $5,000 or more" as § 666 requires. The court first
dealt with the problem that payments in question were for intangible
items-conjugal visits that were hard to value. It concluded that the
proper approach to valuation was to consider "how much a person in
the market would be willing to pay for them."3 20 Somewhat more subtle is the question of whether or not to consider if the government in
question can be said to attach a value of $5,000 or more to the transaction. Obviously, the county was not in the business of selling conjugal
visits. Therefore the transaction might not have had the requisite
value as to it. The majority took the straightforward view that "the
statute does not require that the organization, government, or agency
or the person giving the agent the bribe valued the transaction at
$5,000 or more."3 2 1 The dissent relied on language from the Second
Circuit's decision in United States v. Foley 22 to the effect that the corrupt transaction must affect either the recipient's financial interests or
"federal funds directly." 323 Judge Jolly found this requirement not
satisfied.
At first blush, Salinas seems to present a narrow disagreement
over how to interpret the $5,000 requirement when the payment is for
an intangible element such as a permit 32 4 and not in connection with
an outlay from the recipient government such as a purchase3 25 or a
construction contract.3 26 However, the disagreement between the
Fifth and Second Circuits takes us deeply into the core question of
§ 666's application when no federal funds are involved in the particular transaction.
Foley represents such a case. It involved a state legislator whose
state received federal funds.3 27 He took a bribe in order to influence
a change in a legislative vote concerning bank mergers and divesti320 Marmolejo, 89 F.3d at 1194.
321 Id. at 1191.
322 73 F.3d 484 (2d Cir. 1996).
323 Marmolejo, 89 F.3d at 1205 (jolly, J., dissenting) (quoting Foley, 73 F.3d at 493).
Judge Jolly also found there to be ambiguity in the statute and thus invoked the rule
of lenity. See id.
324 See United States v. Mongelli, 794 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Judge Jolly
viewed Mongelli, which did not require that value be computed from the recipient
entity's perspective, as overruled by Foley. See Marmolego, 794 F. Supp. at 1204 n.31.
325 See United States v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1988).
326 See United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1993).
327 Foley, 73 F.3d at 486.
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tures. As in Salinas, it is hard to place a value on the legislative action.
It surely was worth a good deal to the banks involved, although its
effect on the state fisc is not clear. There may be no quantifiable
value to the state. The vote's relation to federal funds received by the
state seems nonexistent. Thus the court reversed the conviction,
holding that "insofar as the presented evidence in this case reveals,
the [voted] exemption affected neither the financial interests of the
protected organization nor federal funds directly."3 28 More than just
a stab at a particular valuation issue, Foley represents an attempt to
rein in

§ 666.329

The court was careful to cite Westmoreland and its statements
about problems of tracing, casting a "broad net," and "preserving the
integrity of the entities that receive the federal funds." 33 0 Before getting to these judicial guidelines, however, the Second Circuit engaged
in a close analysis of the legislative history of § 666, emphasizing its
focus on protection of federal funds. 33 1 As I noted earlier, one can
read the history broadly or narrowly depending, in part, on how far
one takes the concept of "integrity."332 For the Foley court, § 666 responded "to a very specific federal interest, namely, safeguarding the
integrity of federal funds that are intended to serve legislatively defined policy objectives."3 3 3 The emphasis in this part of the opinion is
on the integrity of the funds rather than that of the entity.3 3 4 Despite

the citation of Westmoreland and successor cases, the Second Circuit
found in its own precedents a clear pattern of considering the effect
33 5
of conduct on federal funds.

One might have expected the court to reverse Foley's conviction
on the ground that the prosecution had shown no effect of the bank
vote on federal funds the state received. Instead, it reversed on the
slightly broader ground that neither this effect nor an effect on the
3 36
financial interests of the state was shown.
328

Id at 493.

329 See Marmolejo, 89 F.3d at 1193-94 n.10 (criticizing Foley as inconsistent with
Westmoreland).
330 Foley, 73 F.3d at 491 (quoting Westmoreland, 841 F.2d at 574-75, 577).
331 See id. at 489-90. This analysis was triggered by the ambiguity of the term "[a]
thing of value of $5,000 or more." Id. at 489.
332 See supra text accompanying notes 255-56.
333 Foley, 73 F.3d at 490.
334 See iL ("The assessment of the thing's value must be connected, even if only
indirectly, to the integrity of federal program funds.").
335 See id. at 491-92 (citing United States v. Bonito, 57 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir.
1995), and United States v. Rooney, 37 F.3d 847 (2d Cir. 1994)).
336 See id. at 493. Because the court considered whether there was a financial effect on the state, it discussed the related issue of whether the valuation of the funds in
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The opinion does not explain the relation between the latter effect and the court's emphasis on the protection of federal funds. The
court appears to have viewed a negative effect on the recipient governments' fisc as a proxy for an impact on federal funds. It thus treats
Congress' concern for "integrity" of federal funds as broader than a
requirement that they be involved in the wrongdoing at issue. The
Second Circuit can claim consistency with Westmorelands concern
about the difficulty of tracing federal funds because of its willingness
to consider the recipient's entire financial picture. But it stops short
of the "integrity of the entity" rationale, as the following statement
makes clear: "section [666] was not designed for the prosecution of
corruption that was not shown in some way to touch upon federal
337
funds."
Foley represents the most extensive discussion by a court of appeals of the desirability of limiting § 666, although that discussion
rests solely on the legislative history rather than broader concerns of
federalism. In particular, the court refused to apply the plain meaning of § 666 to a case that fits well within it, as Judge Lumbard argued
in dissent.33 8 As a subsequent district court opinion states, Foley constitutes an attempt to find a middle ground between a "corruption focus" and a "funds focus" of § 666.339 Foley can be criticized as both
over- and under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive because acts that affect
the fisc may not affect federal funds. If Foley had voted to award a
bank $10,000 because of a forced divestiture, that would affect Connecticut's treasury, but any effect on the state's federal funds is speculative at best.3 40 Yet the test may be under-inclusive in that corruption

that does not immediately affect the fisc may ultimately damage it,
spilling over to federal funds. As the district court that analyzed Foley
stated: "In subtle ways a bribe can ultimately lead an official to deplete
agency resources by misusing them. Indeed, if anything, the phrases
'undue influence by bribery' in the legislative history [of § 666] and

question should be calculated from the state's point of view. Thus, it is a mistake to
view the disagreement between the Fifth and Second Circuits as essentially over the
valuation issue. That issue only becomes relevant if one adopts a requirement of po-

tential impact on federal funds that is satisfied by an impact on the state's fisc.
337 Id. (emphasis added).
338 See id.at 495 (Lumbard, J., dissenting) ("The statute does not contain the limitation the majority creates.").

339 United States v. Apple, 927 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (N.D. Ind. 1996).
340 As long as he was paid "anything of value," this would be a classic § 666 prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1993).
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the term 'corruptly' in the statute evoke this insidious, corrupting as'3 41
pect of bribery.
The Supreme Court's decision in Salinas may clarify the validity
of the Foley approach. Rather than limit its decision to the narrow
question of whose perspective controls the valuation, the Court
should reach the broader issue of whether a connection to federal
funds is necessary. Of course, even under this approach, Salinascould
well come out the same way. The bribes for conjugal visits had "a
connection ...with a federal program" and "touch[ed] upon federal

finds."342 The federal government has an obvious interest in how
prisoners are housed in its own jails, as the recent "Badfellas" scandal
illustrates. 3 43 That interest does not disappear when it is using its
funds to pay another government to house them. The more fundamental question about Salinas is whether the Court should not simply
hold that § 666 means what it says in all cases, or whether some narrowing is necessary. In order to evaluate the propriety of any judicially-imposed limitations on § 666, it is necessary to examine the
constitutional dimensions of § 666 and the objections to its reach.
IV.

SECrION

666

AND

=a CONSTITUTION

The constitutional issue that § 666 raises is that it reaches acts of
wrongdoing over which federal power is dubious: actions involving
property or transactions that meet the $5,000 requisite injurisdictions
that receive $10,000 under a federal assistance program, but which
seem to have no connection at all to that assistance. 344 Consider the
following hypothetical. A county stretches from the state's coast deep
into its interior sections. The county receives a one time federal grant
of $15,000 for coastal zone management planning. At the same time,
the County Agricultural Commissioner takes a bribe to get the county
to contribute $6,000 to an interior irrigation project. Apart from
water, what links the two matters? Why does the coastal grant give the
federal government power to prosecute the Agricultural Commissioner for an unrelated act he committed hundreds of miles from the
coastal zone? For that matter, why does it even care? This hypothetical is representative of many decided cases where no connection is
341

Apple, 927 F. Supp. at 1126. It is worth noting, however, that the court goes on

to use a quote from United States v. Duvall, 846 F.2d 966, 972 (5th Cir. 1988), which
focuses on "loyalty and judgment."

342
343
TIMEs,
344

Id.

Foley, 73 F. 3d at 493.
SeeJoseph P. Fried, U.S. Says Guards TurnedJailInto a 'Badfellas' Social Club, N.Y.
May 23, 1997, at Al.
See Engdahl, supra note 5, at 92.
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3 45 It
shown between federal assistance and the defendant's conduct.
presents what I refer to as the § 666 constitutional problem.
One way to analyze this exercise of federal power is through the
Necessary and Proper Clause.3 46 Congress has the power to spend the
funds that constitute the federal assistance. 3 47 It can take the steps
necessary and proper to protect those funds. One federal district
court has, summarily, upheld § 666 on precisely this ground.3 4 The
Necessary and Proper Clause justification represents one form of the
integrity rationale discussed above.3 49 However, the argument that
corruption anywhere in the recipient could undermine protection of
federal funds requires a considerable stretch, despite the traditionally
3 50
broad reading given to the Necessary and Proper Clause.
35
1
That reading dates back to McCulloch v. Mayland, still the lead-

ing case on the issue.3

52

Chief Justice Marshall did, indeed, stress the

importance of a broad construction of the clause 353 in order not to
"impair the right of the legislature to exercise its best judgment in the
selection of measures to carry into execution the constitutional powers of the government. 3 54 However, he indicated that there are limitS3 55

and the examples he gave do not suggest a power run rampant.

345 See, e.g., United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 1996); United States
v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Coyne, 4 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1993);
United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
346 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See ABRAMS & BEALE, supranote 3, at 226 (discussing Necessary and Proper Clause basis of general federal bribery statute and of § 666).
347 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Professor David Engdahl argues that the spending power finds its roots in the Property Clause. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2; Engdahi, supra note 5, at 50-53.
348 See United States v. Bigler, 907 F. Supp. 401 (S.D. Fla. 1995); see also United
States v. Russo, No. 96-1394, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 6513 (2d Cir. April 8, 1997) (discussing the spending power and the protection of funds, although with no mention of
the Necessary and Proper Clause).
349 See supra text accompanying notes 255-56.
350 See generally JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrUTIONAL LAW
121-24 (4th ed. 1991) (discussing judicial deference).
351 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
352 See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 350.
353 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 417-18 ("The baneful influence of this
narrow construction on all the operations of the government, and the absolute impracticability of maintaining it, without rendering the government incompetent to its
great objects, might be illustrated by numerous examples drawn from the constitution, and from our laws.").
354 Id. at 420.
355 See id at 421. Marshall states: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional." Id Justice O'Connor has argued that this quote
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Thus he reasoned that Congress' power to establish courts would,
under Necessary and Proper analysis, carry with it the power to punish
perjury and falsifying records in those courts.35 6 The § 666 problem
presents a substantially lesser degree of federal interest. Recent scholarship has stressed the potential importance of a disjunction between
"necessary" and "proper."3 5 7 Analysts have suggested that the propriety of national laws should be evaluated on the basis of "whether such
laws are consistent with principles of federalism."3 58 Justice Scalia expressed agreement with this reading in Print. 35 9 Quite apart from this

approach, the phrase "Necessary and Proper" suggests a degree of relatedness between the chosen means and the exercised power.3 60 The
§ 666 constitutional problem presents so many situations where the
relatedness to protecting federal funds is either so extremely attenuated or nonexistent that the statute does not seem necessary, without
reaching the issue of propriety. The majority in Lopez rejected an
analysis of the Commerce Clause that would allow piling "inference
upon inference" 3 6' so that everything affects commerce. The same
might be said of remote possibilities that make every statute somehow
necessary to effectuate an enumerated power.3 62 One should be reluctant, however, to let a conclusion of serious constitutional
problems rest on Necessary and Proper analysis. The clause is generally viewed as enhancing congressional power. In addition, there is a
lack of developed precedent to guide any such analysis.
As an alternative, it may be helpful to analyze the § 666 constitutional problem in light of general welfare-spending power precedents, 3 63 particularly cases concerning the validity of grant conditions.

On this question there is a well developed body of judicial decishould limit Congress' power rather than expand it. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 585 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

356 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 417.
357 See Stephen Gardbaum, Rethinking ConstitutionalFederalism,74 TEX. L. Rxv. 795
(1996); Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper"Scope of FederalPower:.AJurisdictionalInterpretationof the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993).
358 Randy E. Barnett, Necessary andProper,44 UCLA L. Rv. 745, 773 (1997) (citing
Gardbaum, supra note 357).
359 Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. at 2378-79 (1997). Justice Scalia appears to
favor the approach to the Necessary and Proper Clause taken by Lawson and Granger.
Id. at 2379.

360 See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 417.
361 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995).
362 Cf United States v. Wyncoop, 11 F.3d 119, 123 (9th Cir. 1993) (discussing the
scope of § 666).
363 See Baker, supra note 31, at 1924-32 (tracing development of Supreme Court
precedents).
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sions,364 as well as of academic commentary. 365 Moreover, the disputed issues are strikingly similar. Attacks on grant conditions tend to
focus on whether they are related to the purpose for which the federal
funds were awarded, 36 6 or whether they inject too great a federal presence into an area of state competence. 367 Finally, it makes sense to
utilize the General Welfare-spending power cases since they rest on
interpretations of the same clause of the Constitution that authorizes
§ 666.
There are, however, two serious objections to the use of this precedent that must be dealt with. The first is that § 666 is not a grant
condition. As the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York stated: "18 U.S.C. § 666 does not impose a condition on the
receipt of federal funds. The statute neither requires a state's compliance with federal regulatory or administrative directives, nor prevents
state action."3 68 Furthermore, § 666 applies not to recipient governments but to their officials and even to private parties. 369 However,
what makes § 666 like a grant condition is that the recipient can avoid
the statute's application to its officials by not accepting federal funds
of $10,000 or more. It is the ultimate form of government regulation-the utilization of the processes of the criminal law-but variable
in its application, triggered only by the receipt of federal funds. Section 666 sets out federal requirements for recipient governments, and
prescribes negative consequences if those requirements are not
honored. It thus operates in a similar way to grant conditions.
There are, of course, serious doctrinal problems with using the
essentially contractual grant relationship as the basis for any binding
norms, which might apply to consideration of the general validity of
§ 666, apart from what I call the constitutional problem.3 70 I will fo364 See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
365 See Baker, supra note 31; Engdahl, supranote 5; McCoy & Friedman, supranote

31.
366
367

See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 213-14 (1987).
See Virginia Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 570-72 (4th Cir. 1997) (en

banc) (plurality opinion), rev' 86 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir. 1996).
368 United States v. Cantor, 897 F. Supp. 110, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
369 See United States v. Thompson, 685 F.2d 993 (6th Cir. 1982) (distinguishing
between regulation of states and regulation of officials). In my view, the prosecution
is inescapably a federal judgment about, and an intrusion into, the working of state

government. Cf Printz v. United States, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 2382 (1997) ("To say that the
Federal Government cannot control the State, but can control all of its officers, is to
say nothing of significance.").
370 Professor David Engdahl has noted that conditional grants are, in essence, contractual agreements, and thus the parties should be bound by contractual principles.
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cus here on the latter, however, and treat § 666 as analogous to a
grant condition. It seems most analogous to what the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations calls a "crosscutting requirement": "generally applicable requirements imposed on grants across
71
the board to further various national social and economic policies." 3
A second objection to applying the General Welfare-spending
power precedents, or any others, to the § 666 constitutional problem
is that Congress has foreclosed any constitutional inquiry through the
use of a jurisdictional predicate or element. The Supreme Court in
Lopez placed great emphasis on the fact that the statute before it, the
37 2
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, contained no such element.

The opinion suggests that the presence in a statute of a requirement
of a case-by-case inquiry to demonstrate the presence of federal power
will insulate the statute from general attack. Many federal criminal
statutes used in the anti-corruption field contain jurisdictional elements. For example, the Travel Act3 7 3 provides, in part, that:

(a) Whoever travels in interstate or foreign commerce or uses the
mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent
to-(I) distribute the proceeds of any unlawful activity; or (2) commit any crime of violence to further any unlawful activity [shall be
punished] .74
One might contend that, similarly, § 666 contains ajurisdictional
element:3 75 it is only applicable in entities receiving more than

$10,000 annually in federal assistance.3 7 6 The analogy is misleading,
however. The Travel Act links the wrongdoing directly to the subjects
over which Congress has power: travel and facilities of commerce.
The reason why there is a § 666 constitutional problem is that that
statute's predicate contains no such direct link. The wrongdoing may
See Engdahl, supranote 5, at 71-72. "[L] egislation enacted pursuant to the spending
power is much in the nature of a contract .... " Id. at 70 (quoting Pennhurst State

Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)). With this in mind, Professor
Engdahl questions the ability of Congress to "punish theft from beneficiaries of its

largesse," as the federal government has no control over the money once it has been
dispersed. Id. at 92. It is upon these grounds that Professor Engdahl would find
§ 666 unconstitutional. IM
371

ADvisoRY

COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGULATORY FEDER-

ALISM: PoUcy, PRocEss, IMPACr AND RFoRM 8 (1984).
372 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561-62 (1995).
373 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1994).
374 Id. The defendant must also "thereafter" perform or attempt to perform specified crimes.
375 See United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536, 1540 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
376 See id (referring to the $10,000 requirement as a "federal fundingjurisdiction
element").
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have nothing to do with the federal funds. If Congress had said "Whoever travels and within one year thereof commits robbery can be tried
in a federal court," it is doubtful that the "predicate" would save the
statute. The latter would reach vast quantities of conduct over which
Congress has no power. Nor could Congress provide that any person
77 Secwho uses the mails is subject to federal criminal jurisdiction.
tion 666 looks like the hypothetical statutes in that it contains no link
between the federal assistance somewhere in the jurisdiction and the
wrongdoing somewhere in the jurisdiction. I do not mean to say this
automatically makes the statute unconstitutional, but it negates the
force of the jurisdictional predicate objection to asking the question:
"Is the § 666 constitutional problem serious enough to raise doubts
about the statute's validity?"
If we turn to the General Welfare-spending power decisions, specifically the condition cases, the Dole test seems the obvious focal
point.378 It represents both the Court's most recent detailed treat-

ment of the issue 379 and an attempt to distill the teaching of prior
precedent.3 80 The first two restrictions that Dole elaborated do not
pose serious obstacles in an analysis of the § 666 constitutional problem. The goal of reducing corruption and related practices seems to
fit within the concept of the general welfare, especially given the great
degree of judicial deference to Congress on that question.3 8 ' As for
ambiguity, the language of § 666 is rather blunt. It appears sufficiently clear to appraise recipients of federal assistance of the criminal
consequences for their officials.38 2 Buttressing this conclusion is the
fact that several courts have rejected vagueness challenges to the stat377 The mail fraud statute is only triggered when the mails are used "for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice" as defined by the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 1341
(1994). The way in which this jurisdictional "hook" is worded guarantees at least
some relationship between the crime and the federal power upon which the statute
rests. But see Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 723-24 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Whether such a hook should be enough to federalize an area of the crimi-

nal law is, of course, an important issue. See supra note 102. Section 666, however,
goes one step further, requiring no relation between the money spent by the federal
government and the theft or bribery.

378 See Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987).
379 There was some limited discussion in the Court's decision in New Yor* v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
380 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207-08. The Southern District of New York, in United States v.
Cantor,897 F. Supp. 110, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), discounted the precedential authority
of Dole in § 666 cases, but then proceeded to apply parts of the Dole test.

381 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. Thus, Congress could almost certainly appropriate funds
for anti-corruption grants.
382 See id. (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17
(1981)) (discussing the second element of the test).
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ute.3 83 If a statute can surmount a criminal defendant's vagueness
challenge, it almost certainly satisfies Dole's nonambiguity require3 84
ment.
The difficulties begin when one applies to the § '666 constitutional problem the third Dole restriction: " [T]hat conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated 'to the federal
interest in particular national projects or programs.', 3 8 5 As discussed
above,3 86 analysts of the spending power have viewed the relatedness
prong, or some variant thereof, as one of the most promising ways to
constrain it. In Dole itself, Justice O'Connor dissented on the ground
that "Congress may only condition grants in ways that can fairly be
said to be related to the expenditure of federal funds.13 8 7 However, to
the extent that the spending power doctrine is helpful, the relatedness issue provides no clearer answer than it did in consideration of
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Whether or not the statute is re388
lated to the receipt of federal funds (or other form of assistance)
depends on how far one takes the concept of integrity. If it applies
only to the wholeness of the funds or to the honesty of the manner in
which they are administered, many applications of § 666 will fail the
relatedness test. If, on the other hand, one takes the view that the
integrity of the recipient as a whole is relevant to the integrity of the
funds, relatedness is satisfied.
As discussed above in the county hypothetical, this is a considerable stretch.3 89 Illegalities in one part of a recipient will often have
383 See United States v. Paradies, 98 F.3d 1266, 1288 (11th Cir. 1996) ("[I]n construing § 666, we agree with the following expression of the Fifth Circuit: '[W]e find
the relevant statutory language plain and unambiguous.'"(quoting United States v.
Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572, 576 (5th Cir. 1988))); United States v. Urlacher, 979
F.2d 935, 939 (2d Cir. 1992) ("He cannot be heard to complain that the statute was
vague.").
384

It should be noted, however, that several courts have found sufficient ambigu-

ity in the statute to resort to the legislative history with respect to the extent to which
Congress intended to reach transactions where no federal funds were involved. See
United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1202 (5th Cir. 1996) (Jolly, J., dissenting)
("Given this ambiguity, it is necessary to turn to the legislative history for guidance in
interpreting and applying the statute."); United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484, 489 (2d
Cir. 1996) ("Accordingly, we look to the legislative history and purpose of the statute
for illumination.").
385

Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444,461

(1978) (plurality opinion)).
386 See supra text accompanying notes 179-82.
387 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 217 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
388 The focus here is on funds, because grant concepts are being applied.
389 See supra text accompanying notes 344-45.
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nothing to do with the federal funds. 390 In this context, the holding
of Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission 391 is consistent with a specific
relatedness requirement. The statute there analyzed applied to political activities of state officials whose employment was financed in
whole or in part with federal funds. 392 Oklahoma's holding does not
justify exercising power over all state officials just because the state
receives federal funds. To the extent the third Dole restriction is rele3 93
vant, the § 666 constitutional problem is a real one.
There remains, however, the suggestion in Dole that Congress can
use grant conditions "to further broad policy objectives." 394 As noted,
Oklahoma itself might be an example. Congress' real objective was to
further "good government" as the Hatch Act embodied it. Perhaps
Congress could have gone further than it did, by prohibiting partisan
activity by a range of recipient state officials, whether they were involved with federal funds or not. Section 666 could then be seen as an
example of furthering this national interest. As noted in Part I, one
can posit a number of contemporary reasons why the national government cares about corruption at the state and local level.39 5 The award
of federal funds gives it a hook to enforce this concern throughout
the entire recipient government. Section 666 thus satisfies this broad
form of the relatedness prong, broadly construed.
If this analysis is correct, however, the concept of "national problem" serves more as a blank check than as a limitation. As Professors
McCoy and Friedman note, "[r] equiring that the condition simply relate to a national problem rather than specify characteristics of the
particular goods and services to be purchased by the grant is tantamount to a statement that Congress can regulate perceived national
problems through the spending power. '3 96 The recurring notion of
using the third Dole element to permit only conditions that relate to

390 See United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536, 1540 n.7 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (noting
prosecutors conceded that a "secretary for a state parking agency" would be subject to
§ 666 prosecutions).
391 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
392

See Dole, 483 U.S. at 217 (discussing Oklahoma).
393 But see United States v. Cantor, 897 F. Supp. 110, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) ("Nor is
the conduct prohibited by § 666 so remote from the federal interest in protecting
federal funds from the effects of local bribery schemes as to exceed the scope of
Congressional spending power or to run afoul of the Tenth Amendment.").
394

Dole, 483 U.S. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)).

395

See supra text accompanying notes 90-107.

396

McCoy & Friedman, supra note 31, at 121.
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97

may be workable in the context of condi-

dons specific to a particular grant. However, it is less satisfactory when
applied to crosscutting conditions applicable to a range of grants.
These conditions require grantees to adhere to a national policy such
as various forms of nondiscrimination.3 98 Section 666 looks like one
of these conditions. No recipient of federal funds of more than
$10,000 shall permit specified corrupt practices. Instead of withholding funds from a governmental unit,3 9 9 the "sanction" is criminal pros-

ecutions of that government's officials. The analysis of Professors
McCoy and Friedman suggests that such conditions might be valid
0
only if sustainable under one of Congress' regulatory powers. 40
Under this approach, the § 666 constitutional problem would lead to
a conclusion of invalidity because there is no independent regulatory
power over state and local corruption. 40 1 However, the proposed
limit is not found in Dole.
This focus on the third element of Dole represents an attempt to
apply the internal limits40 2 on the spending power to the § 666 constitutional problem. It raises serious questions about the statute's validity, but falls short of providing clear guidance for two reasons. First,
397 See id. at 122; Dole, 483 U.S. at 215-16 (O'Connor, J. dissenting). For a discussion of the distinction between "reimbursement spending" and "regulatory spending," see Baker, supra note 31, at 1963.
398 Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a classic example. See McCoy & Friedman, supranote 31, at 114. Apart from the source of power to enact it, a cross-cutting
condition also raises questions of its reach. Congress and the Supreme Court have
disagreed over whether Title VI authorizes the withholding of funds from an entity
within which there is some discrimination, or whether the withholding should be limited to the particular program in violation. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988), overrulingGrove City College v. Bell, 465
U.S. 555 (1984). Section 666 takes the same broad approach, but is not based on a
regulatory power. Moreover, it applies the sanctions of the criminal law rather than
the withholding of funds.
399 Withholding funds is the classic sanction in the grant-in-aid context. There has
also been considerable controversy over the possibility of private enforcement of
grant conditions. See, e.g., Engdahl, supra note 5, at 101-05 (discussing Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980), and criticizing the availability of private suits); cf. Blessing v. Freestone, 117 S. Ct. 1353 (1997) (suggesting continued availability, but not
reaching the issue).
400 See McCoy & Friedman, supra note 31, at 114; South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203, 217 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
401 There would be an independent regulatory power over state and local corruption if one accepts Professor Kurland's excellent analysis of the Guarantee Clause. See
Adam H. Kurland, The Guarantee Clause as a Basis for FederalProsecutions of State and
Local Officials, 62 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 369 (1989).
402 See SToNE ET AL., supra note 100, at 189-90 (discussing internal and external
limits).
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the current status of spending power analysis is itself uncertain. Dole
and the subsequent discussion of the spending power in New York v.
United States 40 3 suggest few limits. As Professor Baker contends, after
Lopez, 40 4 the Court should take a closer look at the reach of the power
consistent with its emphasis on the need to limit the enumerated powers to maintain a healthy federalism. 40 5 However, that has not happened yet. The second reason why internal limits analysis falls short
here is that it has been developed primarily in the context of grant
conditions. Section 666 is like a grant condition in important ways,
but it is different enough that we may wish to consider the statute
from another perspective. Let us treat § 666 like any other federal

criminal statute applicable to state and local governments. Apart
from the internal limits question of basic authority to enact it, it is
subject to external limits, which Justice Rehnquist in Dole referred to
as the general prohibition on engaging "in activities that would themselves be unconstitutional.

'40 6

The Dole opinion indicates that federalism-based external limits
would not be applicable to exercises of the spending power. 40 7 I think
that the Court would, and should, reconsider this position. Indeed, a
plurality of the Fourth Circuit appears to have already advocated this
step. 40 8 It is important to remember that Dole was decided two years
after Garciav. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority ° 9 had seemed
to discredit any notion of judicially enforceable federalism-based limits on Congress. 410 A lot has happened since Garcia.411 The Court has
revived both the precepts of federalism-based external limits on con-

403 505 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1992); see generally Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty
and Subordinancy: May Congress Commandeer State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95
COLUM. L. REv. 1001 (1995) (providing a detailed analysis of New York).
404 514 U.S. 545 (1995).
405 Baker, supranote 31, at 1916. A plurality of the Fourth Circuit has apparently
taken Professor Baker's view to heart in its recent decision in Virginia Dep't of Educ.
v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (plurality opinion) (discussing favorably a Tenth Amendment challenge to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
passed under the spending power), rev' 86 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir. 1996).
406 Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987).
407 Id.
408 See Riley, 106 F.3d at 571-72 (discussing the Tenth Amendment as an external
restraint on spending in addition to coercion).
409 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
410 See id. at 549.
411 See Brown, supra note 33, at 259-77.

19981

STEALTH

STATUTE

gressional power 4 12 and the power of the judiciary to enforce these
limits. 413

The exact contours of the doctrine are only beginning to emerge.
There is at least one absolute bar on the federal government's control
of states. This prohibition is the anti-commandeering principle as developed in New York and extended in Printz. It does not follow that
external limits will always take the form of bars on the national government or of zones of state autonomy from which its reach is excluded. This was the approach of NationalLeague of Cities.4 14 Yet even
that case, during its uncertain tenure, evolved into a partial balancing
test. 4 15
There may well be room for balancing approaches as federalism,based limits on the national government become clearer. In Printz,
Justice Scalia rejected balancing in the case of laws that apply only to
states, but left open the possibility of its use in the case of a general
law that applies to state governments. 41 6 Section 666 is such a law.
The current majority refers to its approach as "dual sovereignty."41 7 (The New York Times refers to it as "cockeyed" federal412 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
413 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("[T]he federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional structure and plays
too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene when one or
the other level of Government has tipped the scales too far.").
414 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also Deborah Jones Merritt, Three Faces of Federalism:Findinga
Formula for the Future, 47 VAin. L. REv. 1563 (1994) (discussing three "models" of
federalism).
415 See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288
n.29 (1981) (stating that the relation of state and federal interest must not be such
that "the nature of the federal interest... justifies state submission"); NationalLeague
of Cities,426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (joining the majority because, in
part, it adopts a "balancing approach"). But see Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383 ("But where,
as here, it is the whole object of the law to direct the functioning of the state executive,
and hence to compromise the structural framework of dual sovereignty, such a 'balancing' analysis is inappropriate.").
416 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2383 (stating that a balancing test "might be relevant if
we were evaluating whether the incidental application to the States of a federal law of
general applicability excessively interfered with the functioning of state governments"); see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 117 S. Ct. 2028, 2039 (1997)
("The theme that thus emerges... is one of balancing of state and federal interests."
(quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 27 (1989) (Stevens, J.,
concurring))).
417 E.g., Print, 117 S. Ct. at 2376 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457
(1991)).
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418

I find helpful Professor Merritt's analysis of the development
419
as an "autonomy model" of federalism.
External limits draw much of their content from the notions of
autonomy and accountability. Essential to both notions is the ability
of states to establish and to police their governmental processes. 420
The § 666 constitutional problem is an obvious candidate for an external limits inquiry. The statute sets up standards of conduct for governmental officials. It thus leads to federal investigation and
prosecution of a wide range of state and local officials42 ' for a wide
range of corrupt activities that need not involve federal funds at all.
Yet the development of ethical standards and the policing of its own
officials is an important aspect of a government's exercise of soverism.)

eignty. 422 Applying external limits analysis would probably not mean

the demise of federal anti-corruption statutes applicable to state and
local governments. Many long-standing federal statutes extend to various forms of corrupt activities by state and local officials. 42 3 The cur424
rent Court has applied them without questioning their validity.
Justice Thomas and other members of the Court generally favorable
to state concerns have specifically recognized the existence of substantial federal power in this area.4 25 The most promising resolution of
the conflict is the utilization of some form of balancing test.426 In the

grant context, Professor Candice Hoke has suggested such an approach in lieu of the "lax" Dole test 42 7 or the difficulties of fashioning a
coercion limit.428 She would ask whether the federal government has

"constitutionally sufficient justifications" for impeding the ability of
418

Two Days That Shaped the Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1997, at A20.

419 See Merritt, supra note 414, at 1570.
420 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457. For an excellent early definition of autonomy, see
Kaden, supra note 31, at 849-53.
421 According to § 666, "the term 'agent' means a person authorized to act on
behalf of another person or a government and, in the case of an organization or
government, includes a servant or employee, and a partner, director, officer, manager, and representative." 18 U.S.C. § 666(d) (1) (1994).
422

See, e.g., Brown, supra note 33, at 275-76; Williams,

supra note

50, at 154.

423 See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
424 See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992); McCormick v. United
States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991).
425 See Evans, 504 U.S. at 290-91 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
426 See generally Brown, supra note 33, at 273-74 (discussing Justice Blackmun's
concurrence in NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).
427

See Hoke, supra note 139, at 571.

428 See id, at 571-72; see also Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989)
("Certainly, one reason for the federal courts' lack of enthusiasm for the theory is its
elusiveness.").
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state governments to function in an independent and representative
42 9
fashion.
Applying any such approach to federal legislation regulating the
internal affairs of state governments would be a complicated task.
Each set of interests at stake can seemingly point in two directions.
The federal government has an interest in preserving what Professor
Hoke terms "the constitutional role of states," 43 0 as well as in enforcing its laws to advance the interests identified in Part I. Yet the former
concern might mean leaving the states alone. At the same time, state
interests do not argue only for autonomy. They can be furthered by
federal prosecutions. Federal action may spur state officials to change
laws or the means of their enforcement, or it may cause citizens to
demand more of their own officials at the risk of being replaced. 43 '
An important variable is the extent to which states can police themselves. 43 2 There must, however, be a wide range of cases where the
federal interest is so slight that the balance tilts against federal involvement. I think that many § 666 cases fall into this category. Small scale
thefts of state property,4 33 diversion of parking fines,4 34 and diversion
of employee time 43 5 do not seem to threaten the federal interest in
the constitutional functioning of the states. Section 666 intrudes
deeply into the workings of state and local government, applies to
many trivial cases, and can apply in many instances when there is no
effect on federal funds. Of course, any corrupt activity chips away at
state integrity, but any federal enforcement chips away at state
autonomy.
External limits analysis heightens the doubts about the § 666 constitutional problem that internal limits analysis has already raised.
The absence of federal funds removes the only direct source of fed429 See Hoke, supranote 139, at 572 (quoting CASS R. SuNsTErN, THE PARTiAL CONsTrrT=ON 292 (1993)). Many grant statutes require the enactment of state enabling
or related legislation. Strict application of the anti-commandeering principle would
invalidate any such condition. This further supports the use of a balancing test.
430 Id.
431 See ABRAMs & BEALE, supranote 3, at 248 (arguing that federal prosecution is a
"desirable second line of defense" in corruption cases); Brown, supra note 33, at
285-86.
432 See Rory Y Little, Myths and Principles of Federalism, 46 HASTINGS LJ. 1029,
1077-80 (1995) (proposing a requirement of particularized inquiry into the effectiveness of state and local action); Williams, supra note 50, at 155.
433 See United States v. Valentine, 63 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 1995).
434 See id.; see also United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1538, 1540 n.7 (S.D. Cal.
1996) (noting that the United States agreed at oral argument that "a secretary for a
state parking agency" would be subject to § 666 prosecution).
435 See United States v. Delano, 825 F. Supp. 534 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
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eral power. A general concern with governmental integrity is not
enough. The § 666 constitutional problem places the statute under a
cloud. One way to remove the cloud is through construction. Several
courts have restricted the apparent reach of § 666 through a variety of
techniques: refusing to apply it when a narrower statute was directly

43 7
on point,436 formulating a test that would render it inapplicable,

and applying principles of clear statement to find a particular transaction excluded. 438 I believe that the latter is the most promising place
to start, particularly given the strong recent interest within the lower
federal courts in applying the clear statement rule both to exercises of
the spending power 43 9 and to federal ant-corruption efforts. 440
The clear statement rule takes several forms.441 It rests on the
premise that Congress would not impose obligations on states without
stating precisely what those obligations are. Although § 666 does not
subject the states themselves to criminal prosecution, I view the prosecution of officials for failing to govern the state properly as analogous
to the types of situations that have triggered the rule. At the heart of
the principle of clear statement are precepts of federalism, particularly the notion that courts should be reluctant to assume that Congress has acted to upset the federal-state balance in an area of
traditional state concern. 44 2 The rule can be viewed as a form of
"quasi-constitutional law." 443

The rule appears in a variety of contexts. In the Eleventh Amendment context it permits states to avoid being sued in federal court
under broadly worded statutes that would seem to permit such suits,
unless the law specifies suits against states. 444 In grant-in-aid disputes
the Court has utilized the rule to preclude the enforcement of grant
436 See United States v. Cicco, 938 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1991) (concluding that 18
U.S.C. § 601 was more on point).
437 See United States v. Foley, 73 F.3d 484, 493 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating "that section
was not designed for the prosecution of corruption that was not shown in some way to
touch upon federal funds").
438 See United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536, 1541 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
439 See Virginia Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (en banc),
rev g86 F.3d 1337 (4th Cir. 1996).
440 See United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (overturning earlier application of rule to honest services prosecution under wire fraud
statute).
441 See generally Note, ClearStatement Rules, Federalism, and CongressionalRegulation of
States, 107 HAv. L. REV. 1959 (1994).
442 See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
443 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: ClearStatement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
444 E.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
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conditions against states unless the requirement is stated unambiguously. 445 Even when statutes impose unquestioned obligations on
states, the Court has utilized the rule to choose the least onerous of
those obligations when they intrude upon state processes and
44 6
threaten state autonomy.
The rule acts as something of a proxy for judicial oversight of the
political process 447 and as a substitute for an absolute bar on congressional regulation of states. To the extent that the Court is moving
closer to reestablishing such bars in its recent elaboration of external
limits, 448 this development strengthens the appeal of the clear statement approach. It calls for narrowing readings of seemingly broad
statutes, in part to avoid constitutional questions. If there are real
constitutional issues, that is all the more reason to invoke the rule. In
a sense, the federalist wing of the Court gets to have it both ways.
They can invoke the rule to curb congressional power over states,
while their pronouncements that the rule must be utilized serve to
reinforce the notion that constitutional limits do exist. 449
There are two major obstacles to any utilization of the clear statement technique to resolve the § 666 constitutional problem. The first
is that the statute seems clear enough about when and how it applies
to states and their subdivisions. It is triggered by the receipt of a specified amount of federal assistance and it applies to specific acts of
wrongdoing. Many courts have relied on this clarity as a reason for
not limiting § 666's scope. 450 The second obstacle is that the clear
statement approach is normally invoked to deny applicability of a stat445 SeePennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (stating
that if Congress desires to condition the States' receipt of federal funds, it "must do so
unambiguously"); see also South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
446 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991). There is a strong emphasis in the
majority opinion on state sovereignty, exemplified by the following quote: "Through
the structure of its government, and the character of those who exercise government
authority, a state defines itself as a sovereign." Id. at 460.
447

See id.; see also LAURENCE H.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAWv,

§ 5-8, at

317 (2d ed. 1988) ("[T]o give the state-displacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity would evade the very procedure for lawmaking on which Garcia
relied to protect states' interests.).

448

See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997); New York v. United States,

505 U.S. 144 (1992). There has also been a recent trend in the Court to strengthen

the Eleventh Amendment as well. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct.
2028 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
449

Cf. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 477 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
450 See, e.g., United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. granted
sub nom. Salinas v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997); United States v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1988).
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ute,45 1 or to choose between plausible constructions in the way that
most respects state autonomy. 452 Here, engrafting a limit to respond
to the § 666 constitutional problem would mean adding words to the
statute. This is a more substantial exercise of judicial power 453 than
developing a test to define a broad statutory term such as the concept
454
of "enterprise" in RICO.
Nonetheless, I think that utilization of the clear statement approach is appropriate in the context of § 666. There is a serious constitutional problem when the statute leads to federal prosecution in
cases where no federal funds are involved or affected. The legislative
history suggests that a narrowing to emphasize the protection of federal funds would be consistent with Congress' intent. Moreover, even
the courts that proclaim the statute's clarity often end up examining
that history, perhaps out of lingering doubts that the statute really
45 5
means what it says.
Thus, I take the approach that applying the statute to cases where
there is no impact on federal funds is such an extraordinary step that
one would expect Congress to state it expressly. My approach to the
§ 666 constitutional problem is to stay as close to the language of the
statute as possible while recognizing the need to narrow it.
United States v. Bass45 6 is a helpful precedent. It is one of the cornerstones of clear statement jurisprudence, enunciating the need to
construe statutes to preserve the federal-state balance. 457 The statute
at issue in Bass contained ajurisdictional predicate. The statute made
it criminal for a felon to "receiv[e], posses[s], or tranpor[t] in commerce or affecting commerce . . . any firearm."4 58 According to the
Lopez Court, Bass "interpreted the possession component.., to require an additional nexus to interstate commerce." 459 I would build
451 This is the case with the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Atascadero State
Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).

452 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460.
453 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip Frickey, Foreword:Law as Equilibrium, 108
HAv. L. REv. 27, 82 (1994).
454 See United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir. 1982); ABRAMS & BEALE,
supra note 4, at 462-69.
455 See, e.g., United States v. Westmoreland, 841 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1988). The
Westmoreland court ultimately engaged in a broad reading of § 666, stating that: "It is
sufficient that Congress seeks to preserve the integrity of federal funds by assuring the
integrity of the organizations or agencies that receive them." Id. at 578.
456 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
457 See id. at 349.
458 See United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995) (quoting Bass, 404 U.S.
at 337) (punctuation altered).

459

Id.
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on this example to limit the applicability of § 666 to cases in which
there is a dearer nexus to federal aid. It is true that the Bass Court
essentially altered the sentence's grammar by making existing language modify more than it seemed to. Narrowing § 666 requires adding language. However, the existing language already suggests a
460
focus on federal aid in order to trigger the statute.
Formulation of a limitation would build on cases such as United
States v. Foley' 6 1 and United States v. Wyncoop 4 62 that emphasize the pro-

tection of federal funds and the undesirability of prosecutions under
§ 666 for "corruption that was not shown in some way to touch upon
federal funds," 46 3 as well as Frega'srequirement of a showing that fed-

eral funds were "threatened, either directly or indirectly," 464 or that
"federal funds were corruptly administered, were in danger of being
corruptly administered, or even could have been corruptly administered."4 65 There is similar language in Judge Jolly's dissent in Salinas.46 6 I recognize that adding a nexus to the statute goes beyond
normal clear statement practices. It can be seen as a combination of
them and ofjudicial formulation of a test analogous to that in Foley. If
this approach saves the statute from unconstitutionality and respects
congressional intent, I think the game is worth the candle.
Utilization of a nexus gloss would require the prosecution in a
§ 666 case to show that the defendant's conduct affected federal funds
directly, indirectly, or potentially. The mere presence of federal funds
somewhere in the jurisdiction would not be enough. Courts would
have to make a more detailed inquiry into the existence of the jurisdictional predicate. It is important to recognize that they make such
inquiries all the time under such statutes as the Travel Act,46 7 the
460 See 18 U.S.C. § 666(b) (1994). "(b) The circumstance referred to in subsection (a) of this section is that the organization, government, or agency receives, in any
one year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a
grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or other forms of Federal assistance." Id. Narrowing the statute's reach when governments are involved raises the
question of symmetry when the entity is private. I would opt for consistency.
461 73 F.3d 484 (2d Cir. 1996).
462 11 F.3d 119 (9th Cir. 1993).
463 Foley, 73 F.3d at 493.
464 United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536, 1543 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
465 Id.
466 See United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1201 (5th Cir. 1996) (Jolly, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert. granted sub nom. Salinas v. United
States, 117 S. Ct. 1079 (1997); see also Foley, 73 F.3d at 484; Frega, 933 F. Supp. at 1536.
467 See, e.g., Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971) (relating interstate travel to
gambling activity).
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Hobbs Act, 4 68 and the mail and wire fraud statutes. 469 Indeed, they
already engage in similar analysis under § 666.470 Some cases will be
easy because the connection to federal funds is obvious. 471 The receipt of $10,000 anywhere within the jurisdiction should be enough to
trigger the nexus requirement. The prosecution might not be required to show receipt by the particular sub-entity within which the
defendant works, at least in the case of fungible or pass-through
funds. 4 72 Fungible assistance is different than aid to a discreet project.
I recognize that courts would have to work such problems out. Utilization of a nexus approach would reduce the number of § 666 prosecutions. On the other hand, the federal government has at its disposal a
number of other statutes, some quite broad in scope. If none of these
statutes is applicable, and if a § 666 nexus approach cannot be satisfied, perhaps the matter is not a federal case. To insist that it is invites
a difficult constitutional clash that, for the moment, might well be
avoided.
How would the cases come out under this approach? Many
would be decided the same way. Any case such as Westmoreland that
involved highly fungible federal funds would probably meet it.47 3 Salinas might be affirmed on the ground of indirect threat of corruption
in the administration of federal funds. All of the lower court decisions
cited in the Senate Report would come out in favor of federal jurisdiction. 474 In cases like Foley the prosecution might not be able to make

the requisite showing. Unlike the Foley court, I would view the effect
on Connecticut's fisc as irrelevant. The question would be that of the
effects on its federal funds from the defendant's taking the bribe to
alter votes on the banking bill. A number of cases will probably no
468 See, e.g., United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 383 (1995) (discussing the effect of extortion on interstate commerce).
469 See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (relating defendant's
conduct to the use of mails and wires).
470 See United States v. Rooney, 37 F.3d 847 (2d Cir. 1994) (analyzing whether
federal loans to a real estate developer constitute "federal assistance" under § 666).
The court subsequently concluded that the developer's conduct did not constitute
misapplication of federal funds. Id. at 854.
471 See, e.g., United States v. Finn, 919 F. Supp. 1305 (D. Minn. 1995) (discussing
the theft of federal funds from a grant to an Indian tribe).
472 See United States v. Dransfield, 913 F. Supp. 702, 709-10 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (discussing pass-through issue).
473 Thus, this analysis accepts the application of § 666 to mechanisms such as
block grants.

474 The Senate Report states that it is "the intent to reach thefts and bribery in
situations of the types involved in the Del Toro, Hinton, and Mosley cases cited herein."
S. REP. No. 98-225, at 370 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3511.
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longer fit under § 666. In United States v. Valentine,475 for example,
one count involved the City Recorder's supervision of a scheme to
divert copying fees to an unofficial "kitty." The scheme netted
$8,363.476 Such malfeasance in a locality like Sevierville, Tennessee
(population 7,103)477 may well belong

in the hands of state

authorities. 478
OTHER EMERGING SECTION 666 IssUs-BRIBERY VERSUS
GRATUrrEs AND A GENERAL HoNEsT SERVICES PRoHIrrION

V.

Courts are beginning to focus on the question of limiting the
general scope of § 666. This section will focus briefly on two other
emerging issues under the statute: whether it covers gratuities as well
as bribes, and whether it has the potential to develop into a general
"honest services" statute. There is a growing body of case law on both,
but the cases raise more questions than they answer.
A.

Bribery v. Gratuities

The basic distinction between the bribery and gratuities offenses

is generally accepted. Bribery depends on the presence of a quid pro
quo, a specific official act that the payment may influence. 479 The
gratuities offense occurs when something of value is given to an official who is likely to perform official acts that could benefit the giver.480
The federal civil gratuities statute utilizes the following terms to embody the concept of a prohibited gratuity:
Gifts to Federal Employees
(a) Except as permitted by subsection (b), no Member of Congress
or officer or employee of the executive, legislative, or judicial
branch shall solicit or accept anything of value from a person475 63 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 1995).
476 See idat 461.
477 This figure is from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990
CENSUS. But see supra note 244.
478 Alternative tests might be formulated that focus on the governmental position
of the particular defendant or on the funding of a particular sub-entity within the
recipientjurisdiction. I believe that neither draws the best line nor respects the statutory language as faithfully. Of course, such inquiries might be relevant in applying a
test based on impact on federal funds. See Westmoreland, 841 F.2d at 578 (stating "the
statute limits its reach to entities that receive a substantial amount of federal funds
and to agents who have the authority to effect significant transactions").
479 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)(1994); Whitaker, supra note 83, at 1621.
480 See Whittaker, supra note 83, at 1622.
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(1) seeking official action from, doing business with, or (in the
case of executive branch officers and employees) conducting
activities regulated by, the individual's employing entity; or
(2) whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonperformance of the individual's official
48 1
duties.

The federal criminal code proscribes the two offenses in different
terms and provides different penalties. 4 82 The key to the bribery offense is a corrupt transfer to influence an official act. 483 The key to
the gratuities offense is gifts "for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by [a] public official." 4 84 The distinction
between the two offenses makes sense, but cases can arise at the margin which create some confusion. 48 5 In the context of § 666, the confusion is rampant.
The language of § 666(a) (1) (B) and (a) (2) appears to create the
offenses of giving and receiving bribes in connection with a transaction of the recipient government involving $5,000 or more. 48 6 Some
courts have, in fact, viewed this as a bribery statute only.48 7 However,
the Second Circuit has held that it embraces both offenses. 488 Other
courts have explicitly left the matter open. 48 9 Some courts avoid the
issue by noting that the language of the indictment or jury charge
490
tracks the statute.
The source of the confusion appears to be the Second Circuit's
decision in United States v. Crozier.49 1 The facts suggested bribery of a
481 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (1990).
482 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994); see also ABRAms & B.ALE, supra note 3, at 225-26.
483 See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (A).
484 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c) (1) (A).
485 See Whitaker, supra note 83, at 1650 n.186.
486 18 U.S.C. § 666 (1994).
487 See United States v. Jackowe, 651 F. Supp. 1035 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), overruled by
United States v. Crozier, 987 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1993).
488 See, e.g., United States v. Rooney, 37 F.3d 847 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v.
Coyne, 4 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Crozier, 987 F.2d 893 (2d Cir.
1993). The Supreme Court recently denied certiorariin a case in which the Eleventh
Circuit, in an unpublished opinion, appears to have affirmed a conviction based on a
gratuities theory of § 666. See Fowlkes v. United States, 66 U.S.L.W. 3227 (October 7,
1997).
489 See, e.g., United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150 (1st Cir. 1993); United States
v. Duvall, 846 F.2d 966 (5th Cir. 1988); cf United States v. Frega, 933 F. Supp. 1536,
1539-40 n.6 (S.D. Cal. 1996) (not reaching the issue, but suggesting that the statute
would reach bribery only).
490 See United States v. Medley, 913 F.2d 1248, 1259-61 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating
that the government's argument tracked the statute, even if the instructions did not).
491 987 F.2d 893 (2d Cir. 1993).
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public official in return for a contract. 492 However, the jury instructions reflected a gratuities theory, 493 despite a subsequent attempt to
clarify.49 4 The defendant claimed that he could not be convicted for
conspiracy to violate § 666 on a gratuities theory.4 95 The court finessed any procedural problem by holding that § 666 covers both offenses. 49 6 The court noted some "confusion" as to the relationship
between § 666 and 18 U.S.C. § 201, the federal bribery and gratuity
statute. 497 It may have compounded the confusion by treating the two
statutes as essentially identical. 498 A subsequent Second Circuit opinion involved a conviction in a case where the indictment and jury
charge "tracked" the language of the statute. 499 The court stated that
44a corrupt purpose was an essential element of [defendant's] conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 666."500 If corrupt purpose is essential to a
§ 666 conviction, then that statute covers bribery only.501
There are two reasons why courts are confused about the gratuity/bribery issue. Both point toward treating § 666 as a bribery-only
statute. The first is that the original language of the 1984 statute was
amended in 1986. The original statute proscribed gifts "for or because of the recipient's conduct in any transaction or matter... involving $5,000 or more concerning the affairs of [a] state or
-502 The amended, and current, lanlocal government agency .
guage proscribes "corruptly" giving, receiving, etc. anything of value
"to influence or reward an agent of . . . a state, [or] local... government... in connection with any business, etc."5 0 3 This
492

See id. at 896.

493 See i& at 897.
494 See id.
495

See id at 897-98.

496 See id at 898-900.
497

See idt at 898.

498 See id
499 See United States v. Santopietro, 996 F.2d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993) (considering
whether bribery or gratuities sentencing guidelines should be applied to § 666 convictions). The Index to the UNITED STATE SENTENCING COMMISSION GUmELiNES MANUAL
indicates that both the bribery and gratuities guidelines are applicable to § 666.
UNITED STATE SENTENCING COMMISSION GUmELINEs MANUAL 377 (1995).

500 Id- at 21.
501

See id.; see also United States v. Medley, 913 F.2d. 1248, 1261 (7th Cir. 1990)

("The instruction given, even without using the word 'corruptly,' would not permit a

finding of guilt on some gratuity or real estate fee analysis.").
502 Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1104, 98 Stat. 2143 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1984)).

503 18 U.S.C. § 666(a) (2) (1994).
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is not a "technical" change. 50 4 The change from "for" or "because of'
to "corruptly influencing" is a change from a gratuities to a bribery
505

statute.

A second reason why courts are confused about the issues is that
they assume, correctly, that Congress was concerned about the possibly inadequate scope of 18 U.S.C. § 201 when the defendants are not
federal officials. 50 6 Congress did not, however, enact a mirror image
of § 201 for nonfederal officials. Section 201 contains separate subsections to deal with bribery and gratuities. Section 666 does not. It is
a mistake to attempt to read the two statutes as equal in reach. As the
Second Circuit itself said in Crozier, identical language should be
treated identically.

50 7

Moreover, there are substantial policy arguments against extending § 666 to gratuities offenses. Any such application takes the
statute deeply into a range of government ethics issues5 08 that may be
better handled at the state level. 50 9 States may differ about whether to
treat them as criminal offenses, rely on civil enforcement, or utilize
nonpunitive remedies. 51 0 This seems like an ideal area for states to
512
play a laboratory role 5 11 as opposed to the hard-core area of bribery
where any federal interest in government integrity will be stronger.
Federal prosecutions of state officials for gratuities are controversial, 5 13 and may be difficult or impossible under several of the major

anti-corruption statutes. 514 Without a clearer indication from Congress, § 666 should not be available for end runs around these limits.
504 But see United States v. Apple, 927 F. Supp. 1119, 1127 n.3 (N.D. Ind. 1996)
("[T]he amendments were technical and do not affect this ruling.").
505 See ABRAMs & BEAL, supra note 3, at 225 (discussing the element of "corrupt
intent" in bribery statutes such as 18 U.S.C. § 201); see also United States v. Crozier,
987 F.2d 893, 899 (2d Cir. 1993) ("The amendments were made to limit the scope of
these statutes, and not to broaden them to include new theories.").
506 See S. REP. No. 98-225, at 369-70 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182,
3510-11; see also Crozier, 987 F.2d at 898.
507 Crozier, 987 F.2d at 899.
508 See Brian C. Mooney, Bill Seeks to Clarify Conflict-of-Interest Law, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 5, 1997, at B6.
509 See Williams, supra note 50, at 154; see also Brown, supra note 33, at 230.
510 See MASSACHUSETTS SPECIAL COMM'N ON ETHics FINAL REPORT 13-22 (1995)
(discussing reform of state gratuities law).

511 See Brown, supra note 33, at 280; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S 549,
583 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
512 See Whitaker, supra note 83, at 1621 (discussing the strong federal interest in
"quid pro quo" bribery).
513 SeeJudy Rakowsky, Ex-Hancock Lobbyist Gets Fine,Probation,BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.

28, 1996, at Al.
514 See ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 3, at 245; Whitaker, supra note 83, at 1635.
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Finally, in those cases where gratuities offenses involving state and local officials can have an impact on federal funds, § 201 remains available, at least if the Dixson "national public trust" requirement is
satisfied. 5 15
B.

Towards a GeneralHonest Services Statute?

The extent to which there should be a federal law of "honest services" applicable to state and local governments is highly controversial.516 The controversy has arisen in the context of the mail fraud
statute 517 and Congress' amendment of it to include honest services.5 18 Debate focuses on such issues as prosecutorial discretion, 5 19
the desirability of a federal "catch-all" crime, 5 20 and the extent of federal intrusion into state and local governance. 52 1 In theory the mail
fraud-honest services debate is not applicable to consideration of
§ 666. The former statute specifically covers both frauds involving
honest services and those involving property.5 22 Section 666 covers
only the latter. Moreover, the congressional enactment that extended
mail fraud coverage to deprivations of honest services is only applicable to the mail and wire fraud chapter of Title 18.523
However, I wish to consider briefly whether § 666 might evolve in
the same direction. It contains broad language referring to fraud and
misapplication, as well as the narrower offenses of theft, embezzlement, and conversion.5 24 Cases have begun to explore the outer limits of "property" in the context of this section. It has been applied to
5 26
misuse of employees' services, 525 payments to bogus employees,
515
516

United States v. Dixson, 465 U.S. 482, 500 (1984).
See Moohr, supra note 4, at 155; Williams supra note 50, at 170.

517
518
519
520
521

18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
Id. § 1346; see Williams, supra note 50, at 162.
See Whitaker, supra note 83, at 1635.

Id.
See Moohr, supra note 4, at 156-57.

522 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1345 (1994); see AsAums & BEA.E, supra note 3, at 244.
523 Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603 (a), 102 Stat. 4508 (1988) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. § 1346 (1994)).
524 See 18 U.S.C. § 666 (a) (1) (A) (1994) ("Whoever... embezzles, steals, obtains
by fraud, or otherwise without authority knowingly converts to the use of any person
other than the rightful owner or intentionally misapplies, property.... "). The Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit recently stated that embezzlement was an example of
the "serious corruption" embraced by the honest services doctrine. United States v.
Czubiniski, 106 F.3d 1069, 1076 (1st Cir. 1997).
525 See United States v. Valentine, 63 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Delano, 55 F.3d 720 (2d Cir. 1995).
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and nonexistent contracts. 527 Courts clearly take a broad view of
property. 5 28 However, there is reluctance to extend it to defrauding
the entity of one's own services.5 29 To hold it applicable in these circumstances would be a large step toward another honest services statute. Such a step would be unwise, given the constitutional problem of
§ 666 and the extraordinary reach of such an interpretation. Of
course, if the statute is limited to instances of an effect on federal
funds, that limit would keep honest services uses within bounds.
Moreover, the requirement that "property" be involved may restrict
the possibility of applying it to deprivations of services. Misapplying
your employees' time is one thing:53 0 misapplying your own may be

another, especially if the latter misuse takes the form of a conflict of
interest.
The prospect of applying § 666 to conflicts of interest outside the
bribery context shows how far the statute could intrude into state and
local governmental practices. Suppose that in a city receiving federal
anti-crime assistance a school board member votes to hire her
brother-in-law for a $50,000 job in a context where there is no effect
on federal funds. Conceivably this constitutes misapplication of government property worth more than $5,000. In my view, such conflict
of interest matters should remain with the states. 5 1 From both a constitutional and a textual perspective, § 666 is a weak support for any
such development. In its short life, however, the statute has shown
extraordinary capacity for growth and the potential for bigger things
to come. Thus, no extension of § 666 can be ruled out. Although I
doubt it will happen, I raise the honest services issue here to show how
far the statute might reach.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Federal prosecutions of state and local officials play an important
role in American public life. However, that role should not be immune from re-examination. The use of § 666 is a case in point. The
potential reach of this statute is a cause for concern. Its existing appli526 See United States v. Stout, CRIM. No. 89-317-1-2-3, 1990 WL 136341 (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 18, 1990).
527 See United States v. Moeller, 80 F.3d 1053 (5th Cir. 1996).
528 See United States v. Sanderson, 966 F.2d 184, 189 (6th Cir. 1992).
529 See Valentine, 63 F.3d at 465; United States v. Harloff, 815 F. Supp. 618
(W.D.N.Y. 1993).
530 See Delano, 55 F.3d at 729-30.
531 But see United States v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 724 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that
undisclosed conflicts of interest resulting in personal gain are honest services
violations)
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cations are a greater one. The courts are dealing with a broadly
drafted law that Congress enacted to deal with a relatively narrow set
of problems. The text can enable this law to become a form of general federal anti-corruption statute in any jurisdiction that receives
more than $10,000 in federal assistance. This degree of intrusiveness
raises serious constitutional problems, especially in the face of the
Supreme Court's recent concern for limiting federal authority and
preserving the autonomy of state and local governments. In this Article I have suggested limits. The courts might accept these proposals,
or develop others. A Supreme Court decision in Salinas could be of
great importance. The main goal for all concerned should be to
bring the stealth statute into the light of day.

314

NOTRE DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL. 73:2

